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FROM LOYALTY TO CONFLICT: ADDRESSING FIDUCIARY
DUTY AT THE OFFICER LEVEL
Usha Rodrigues*
Abstract
Conflicts of interest are the quintessential agency cost—the constant,
lurking danger that agents may seek their own personal gain, rather than
the good of the corporation. Yet many corporate employees lack
knowledge as to exactly what constitutes a conflict of interest. This
ignorance facilitated the kind of fraud seen in Enron, WorldCom, and the
options backdating scandals, and may help explain the out-sized payouts
that many high-level corporate officers received even as the financial
institutions they headed verged on self-destruction. Each case required not
only affirmative fraudulent behavior on the part of a few, but also the tacit
acceptance of individuals throughout the company.
Currently there are no solutions to the core agency problem of
conflicts. Corporate law, in both theory and practice, focuses on conflicts
of interest only at the board level via the duty of loyalty. It largely ignores
the true corporate decision makers—the CEO, CFO, and other corporate
officers. To the extent state corporate law does address conflicts at the
officer level, it only discusses how to treat conflicts that have been
voluntarily disclosed—it is silent about how to identify conflicts ex ante.
Federal regulation has likewise failed to prevent rogue agents from taking
from their principals. Neither the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
nor Department of Justice memoranda on entity-level prosecution focuses
on incentivizing corporations to prevent conflicts. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
mandates disclosure of waivers of a corporation’s code of ethics for senior
officers, but this rule may have the perverse effect of encouraging
corporations to weaken their codes, so that there are fewer waivers to
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disclose. This Article is the first to examine this question as an empirical
problem, analyzing SEC filings and concluding that, indeed, this Sarbanes-
Oxley requirement may not lead to any meaningful disclosure.
Because evidence suggests that part of the problem might be a lack of
understanding of what constitutes a conflict, this Article advocates
education as the best option, and explores implementation mechanisms
such as conflicts training, licensing, or certification for high-level
corporate officers.
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1. Although the potential for these conflicts exists in all firms, this Article focuses on the
problem of conflicts of interest in large public corporations, where agency costs are apt to be higher
because of the lack of owners who are motivated or able to monitor managers.
2. Marianne M. Jennings, Fraud is the Moving Target, Not Corporate Securities Attorneys:
The Market Relevance of Firing Before Being Fired Upon and Not Being “Shocked, Shocked” That
Fraud is Going On, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 27, 44–48 (2006).
3. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 197 (Portfolio, 2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs.
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J.
CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2002). For further discussion of the knowledge of fraud throughout the Enron
organization see Jennings, supra note 2, at 38.
4. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1645 (1990). See
generally Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works And
What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 133–34 (Winter 1999) (suggesting that raising employees’
awareness of ethical issues is the biggest challenge managers of ethics compliance face).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
With the tumult of recent bad news in the business world, it is easy to
lose sight of the common threads that link seemingly disparate scandals.
One important theme repeats itself: the durable problem of conflicts of
interest. Even as the Enron and WorldCom frauds gave way to fresher
tales of options backdating, corporate looting, insider trading, and more
recently out-sized golden parachutes, the common denominator remained
the fact that corporate agents put their own interests above those of the
corporation.
Each of these frauds turned on the complicity of multiple individuals,
either by participating in the wrongdoing or by turning a blind eye to it.1
For example, many employees knew about accounting irregularities at
Fannie Mae and about the fraud at HealthSouth.  The Enron board itself2
approved of its Chief Financial Officer’s conflict of interest in investing
in the special-purpose entities that ultimately led to Enron’s downfall.  3
Evidence suggests that a major problem may be ignorance of the nature
of conflicts of interest. Studies have shown that many callers using
corporate whistleblowing hotlines, for example, are seeking guidance on
appropriate behavior, rather than reporting wrongdoing.  While most4
attorneys routinely advise boards of directors of their duty of loyalty, such
advice and counsel is almost entirely lacking when it comes to corporate
3
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5. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About
Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 665 (2007).
6. Id. at 663.
officers.  The CFO of Walt Disney Company went so far as to claim: “I5
was not aware that it was a breach of the duty of loyalty to place one’s
own interests ahead of the interests of shareholders.”  6
Current mechanisms fail to address the conflict-of-interest problem, or
operate only obliquely. In particular, they fail to grapple with the
fundamental role that ignorance plays in the problem.
(1) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 only obliquely addresses
conflict of interest, via disclosure; 
(2) The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and the
Department of Justice’s method for prosecuting corporations
focus on motivating corporations to prevent violations of
external laws, but do not address internal conflicts of interest;
(3) State corporate law focuses on conflicts for board
members rather than for officers, and creates structural
impediments to shareholder action to police such conflicts; 
(4) State corporate law, to the extent it does address conflicts
of interest, describes only how to deal with conflicts once
they are disclosed; it does not provide incentives or
mechanisms to identify them ex ante. 
The remainder of this Part will elaborate more fully on the failings of each
mechanism, and propose officer-level conflicts licensing or certification
as a first step towards rectifying the basic officer-level conflicts of interest
problem facing corporations today.
First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focused on disclosure as a potential
means of enforcement, but limited its mandate to disclosure of board
waivers of the code of conduct for senior officers. This Article presents the
first examination of the content of these disclosures, based on data
collected from recent 10-Q filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. This preliminary study, set forth in Part III.B.2, suggests that
the Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure requirement does not provide meaningful
information to the public, either because the codes of conduct have been
weakened to avoid the necessity for disclosure, or because some behavior
that would require a waiver is never brought before the board in the first
place. 
Second, post-Enron changes in the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines and in the Department of Justice’s methodology for
4
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7. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 687–89 (1997); Frank O. Bowman, III,
Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of
Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 678 (2004);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism,
Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 269 (2004); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New
Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 319 (2007); Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 493–94
(2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s
“Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 957–59 (2006).
prosecuting corporations attempted to prevent future problems. These
changes focused on self-regulation by the organization—forcing
corporations to police themselves to achieve compliance with the law. But
these federal regulatory mechanisms concentrate on motivating
corporations to monitor and prevent future violations of external law, such
as securities and antitrust law, not on the fundamentally internal area of
conflicts of interest. Tracking the federal regulatory responses, the
scholarship in the field has mostly addressed successes or failures in
promoting compliance with these external requirements, not on conflicts.7
Third, state corporate law, of course, does focus on the internal
governance of the corporation via fiduciary duties. Problematically,
however, the law that regulates fiduciary loyalty focuses on the board of
directors, not on the officers. Furthermore, at the state level, shareholders
seeking to enforce the rules against conflicts of interest through derivative
suits face the barriers of the business judgment rule and the doctrines that
limit derivative suits.
Fourth, to the limited extent that state law does address conflicts of
interest, it merely provides a mechanism for sanitizing conflict-of-interest
transactions. While such mechanisms are important, they do not provide
a means of smoking out conflicts in the first place. Without the tools in
place to identify conflicts ex ante, these sanitizing provisions are
ineffective at addressing the underlying problem.
Aside from these four blunt tools, there are no existing mechanisms
that motivate or even educate corporate actors (particularly officers) to
identify conflicts when they emerge, and to respond to them appropriately.
Because the policing of conflicts of interest is weak, and there exists a
basic lack of understanding of what constitutes a conflict of interest,
education seems a logical first step. By creating an environment in which
individuals can identify conflicts, and a culture that does not tolerate
violations of conflicts policies, corporations can help prevent conflicts
problems from arising. Officer licensing or certification in conflicts-of-
interest training provides one avenue for reform. 
This Article first explains why conflicts matter. They are central not
only to corporate law, but also to the field of business ethics. Part II.B
explains how conflicts of interest provide a least common denominator,
5
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8. “The directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due
care, loyalty, and good faith.” Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (citing
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)); see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 456, 459–60 (2004) (examining developments of the good faith doctrine in
the importance of which both lawyers and ethicists can agree on. Part II.C
and Part II.D then survey a wide spectrum of the types of conflicts that can
arise within the corporation, distinguishing vertical from horizontal
conflicts of interest. 
To focus in on the duty of loyalty as it applies to the officers who are
the powerbrokers of the corporation—the CEO, CFO, and similar
employees—one must look to the conflict-of-interest policies contained
in internal corporate codes of conduct. Accordingly, Part III.A examines
the typical provisions in these codes, distinguishing conflicts provisions
from those that focus on “compliance,” (that is, on external laws and
regulations that apply to the corporation) and the aspirational provisions
typical of the corporate social responsibility movement. It is important to
distinguish conflict-of-interest terms from the other provisions of codes of
conduct. Because they are a unifying concern, all corporations are, or
should be, concerned with reducing the agency costs associated with
conflicts of interest, and should want to train and monitor their employees
with regard to breaches of their conflicts policies.
Part III.B of this Article explores how conflicts enforcement is lacking
in present-day corporate practice. Part IV surveys a range of options for
regulating conflicts of interest. It concludes in Part IV.B that education is
a logical first step, given (1) corporations’ independent incentive to police
for conflict, (2) the apparent lack of understanding of what conflicts are,
and (3) the difficulty of accurately assessing the extent of the conflicts
problem. Increasing education or training would make corporate actors
more aware of conflicts as they arise, and of what to do about them.
Without this fundamental knowledge, increased regulation will have
limited effect.
II.  WHY CONFLICTS MATTER
A.  The Centrality of Conflicts in Corporate Law
Conflicts of interest arise when individuals, although obligated by
virtue of their positions to pursue one interest, suffer a bias that naturally
leads them to pursue a contradictory interest. Corporate law hinges on the
notion of conflicts, although it does so obliquely. It purports to concern
itself with the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (and possibly good faith)
that directors owe to the corporation.  However, because of the limits8
6
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Delaware); cf. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006)
(citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)) (holding that the duty of good
faith is part of the duty of loyalty).
9. Duty-of-care suits pose little threat to corporate defendants except when plaintiffs seek
injunctive relief or if a corporation has not used a provision like Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) to limit
director liability for gross negligence. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008).
10. Corporate law students will remember § 102(b)(7) as the Delaware legislature’s reaction
to Smith v. Van Gorkom’s imposition of liability on the Trans Union board for gross negligence.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell,
Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 836 & n.13 (2007). Section 102(b)(7)
of Delaware’s code allows corporations to exculpate directors from liability under the duty of care.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
11. “Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
12. Even though a bedrock principle of agency law is that each agent—each employee, each
officer—owes a duty of loyalty to his or her principal, that is, to the corporation, as Lyman Johnson
and David Millon remind us, corporate officers like the CEO and CFO are fiduciaries by virtue of
their employee status; so, even if they are not directors of the corporation, they are bound by the
agent’s duty of loyalty. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005). Officers’ entitlement to business
judgment rule protection remains unclear. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the
Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing that the business judgment rule
does not, and should not, apply to officers with the same breadth as it applies to directors).
placed on the duty of care in practice,  the dominant duty is loyalty.9 10
Despite the legal salience of the topic, everyday businesspeople tend
not to talk about duties of loyalty. Instead, they speak the language of
conflicts of interest. Businesses may favor the phrase “conflicts of
interest” over “duty of loyalty” because the latter phrase sounds too
old-fashioned for modern business practice. Perhaps the tendency reflects
the reality that the duty of loyalty in practice is not the resounding
aspiration of Cardozo’s famous Meinhard language,  but rather a simple11
prohibition against conflicts of interest.
An additional reason for favoring conflict of interest over
duty-of-loyalty language may be that corporate law’s duty-of-loyalty
jurisprudence focuses mostly on board decisions.  To the extent that we12
focus on conflicts, then, we enlarge our focus to encompass not only the
problems that arise at the board level, but also those that arise with the
most powerful individuals in the corporation—the CEO, CFO, and other
officers. Studying the language of conflicts will give us a perspective on
the duty of loyalty as it applies outside the boardroom.
7
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13. Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2025, 2026 n.1 (2007) (“[S]hareholder primacy remains the dominant ideology.”); Roberta
S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS.
LAW. 1, 1 (2004) (“[T]he shareholder primacy model has become the dominant model in
scholarship theories with regard to the firm, although other models have been proposed and
debated.”); D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 862 (2007) (“As the adherents of director primacy
acknowledge, shareholder primacy remains the dominant view among corporate law scholars.”).
In Europe, the stakeholder model has gained greater traction. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A.
Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social
Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 2–3 (2005).
14. Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 975, 976, 978–79 (2006) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919)).
15. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (arguing that the prevailing principal-agent model of the public
corporation should be replaced by a team production approach in which the board exists “not to
protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members
of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly
other groups, such as creditors”).
16. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (proposing that corporate law theorists should
adopt a director primacy theory that “treats the corporation as a vehicle by which the board of
directors hires various factors of production”).
B.  Conflicts: A Bridge Between Business Ethics and Corporate Law
As we will see in Part III.A, codes of conduct provide the means by
which corporations address conflicts of interest “on the ground.” Business
ethicists and corporate law scholars approach codes of conduct completely
differently. Indeed, there is a fundamental disconnect between how
lawyers and business ethicists think about the proper purposes of a
corporation. Corporate law scholars tend to assess the potential liability,
enforcement, and costs created by a code. Business ethicists speak of the
positive ethical duties a code should embody. The different perspectives
of business ethicists and corporate law scholars are unsurprising given the
deep schism that exists between the two disciplines regarding what ends
corporate governance should serve. This section will first discuss this
divide, and then suggest that the avoidance of conflicts of interest provides
a common ground on which both sides can agree as a starting point for a
discussion of business ethics.
The dominant normative theory for corporate governance in U.S.
corporate law is the shareholder primacy model.  The model postulates13
that the management and directors of a corporation must serve the interests
of the corporation’s shareholders alone, and therefore maximize profits.14
Admitedly, there are alternate conceptions of the role of management in
corporate governance—for example, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s
team production theory,  Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy model,15 16
8
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17. Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation,
31 J. CORP. L. 753, 756 (2006) (advocating for an entrepreneur primacy view of corporate law by
which “corporation law may be understood as a mechanism to support private ordering intended
to provide the modern corporation with a surrogate for the classic entrepreneur”).
18. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Ozymandias as Community Project:
Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility and the Failure of Transparency, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1035, 1062 (2003) (arguing that in the multinational corporate setting, “even where there exists an
identifiable and widely held interest in full transparency, meaningful disclosure will not occur,
unless, at minimum: (1) those in a position to disclose have internalized the transparency norm; and
(2) those outside the community (a) have internalized a norm against a wrong revealed by
transparency, and (b) then act on that revelation”).
19. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 468 (2001) (announcing the triumph of the shareholder primacy model over competing
theories of corporate law).
20. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32–33 (rebutting the notion that a corporation has a “social
responsibility” to do anything other than increase shareholder profits). 
21. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-
Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 2004 (2007) (“By most accounts,
stakeholder theory is the preeminent contemporary normative theory of business ethics, especially
among business practitioners.”).
22. Id.; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 680 (2006) (identifying “the stakeholder theory
as viewing corporate responsibility as a balance of the interests of all corporate constituents, even
when that balance does not maximize profits”).
23. See Conley & Williams, supra note 13, at 1–2 (providing empirical study of the corporate
social responsibility movement); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate
Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 786 (2007)
(“Regardless of when it emerged, empirical evidence suggests a broad adoption of stakeholder
rhetoric within the corporate arena. While that adoption is not universal, the evidence indicates that
most corporations focus on stakeholders in some respect when explaining their corporate
or Charles R.T. O’Kelley’s entrepreneur primacy model.  The corporate17
social responsibility movement has also gained traction within corners of
corporate law scholarship.  Still, it is safe to say that shareholder primacy18
continues its reign. Two prominent corporate law scholars even declared
“[t]he [e]nd of [h]istory for [c]orporate [l]aw” because of the complete
triumph of the shareholder primacy model.  Shareholder primacy’s19
response to the idea that the corporation owes a duty to anyone besides its
shareholders is embodied by economist Milton Friedman’s article entitled:
“The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.”20
Most business ethicists, in contrast to legal scholars, subscribe to the
stakeholder theory of corporate governance.  This view requires that21
corporate managers and directors consider the interests not only of the
shareholders, but also of other “stakeholders” of the corporation:
employees, the local community, suppliers, creditors, and society in
general.  Ethics for them means much more than simply maximizing22
shareholder returns. The corporate social responsibility movement  is but23
9
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responsibility.”).
24. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) (arguing that corporations exist to increase shareholder wealth),
with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1147–48 (1932) (arguing that the corporation owes responsibilities to all corporate constituents, and
to society as a whole).
25. For an excellent discussion of the conflicting rhetoric of the two fields, see Fairfax, supra
note 22, at 679–90. 
26. John R. Boatright, Business Ethics and the Theory of the Firm, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 217,
218–19 (1996).  
27. “Philosophers generally bring philosophical theories of ethics to bear on problems of
business, and they regard the contractual theory of the firm primarily as a subject for criticism using
the resources of philosophical ethics. In particular, stakeholder theory, which stresses the
importance of all groups that affect or are affected by a firm, has been proposed as a more adequate
theory of the firm for studying business ethics.” Id. at 218. 
28. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Commentary: A New Role for Legal Scholarship in Business Ethics,
36 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 517–18 (1999) (quoting three “prominent business ethicist[s]” who prioritize
morality over law).
29. “Business ethics is widely dismissed as irrelevant by researchers in these fields because
of its failure to recognize the existing financial and legal structures of the corporation.” Boatright,
supra note 26, at 219.
one manifestation of this ethos.
Disagreement between the two models is nothing new—indeed, it is at
least as old as the debates between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd in the
pages of the Harvard Law Review in 1932.  What is striking is that two24
different disciplines have apparently settled on two completely different
answers to the central question in their fields—for whom should a
corporation be governed?  Even more striking has been the general lack25
of interest from either side in bridging the gulf between business ethics
and corporate law.  On one hand, ethicists work from philosophical26
theories in order to arrive at the stakeholder theory.  For them, ethics and27
morality both predate law and are normatively superior to it.  On the other28
hand, corporate law scholars and financial economists treat business ethics
as “irrelevant” because it fails to take into account the financial and legal
structures underpinning the corporation.29
Although business ethicists’ positive prescriptions are probably closer to
the lay understanding of ethics, they are more difficult to generalize from
than negative proscriptions against conflicts of interest. Although laudable,
these prescriptions are difficult to enforce and more a matter of choice for
a corporation. For example, although many individuals might regard
environmentally friendly policies as a part of ethical governance, not all
corporations might apply these policies, and those that did might apply them
differently. When generalizing about serving the interests of the corporation
as a whole, the avoidance of conflicts of interest is a much safer, lower
common denominator than any particular positive ethical prescription.
10
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30. This is especially true if we say “‘[e]thics’ means what we do when we think beyond
immediate self-interest; [and that] ideally, ethics involves inspired and creative compassion for
others.’” Don Mayer, Fort’s ‘Business as Mediating Institution’—A Holistic View of Corporate
Governance and Ethics, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 595, 596 (2004) (book review) (citing TIMOTHY L. FORT,
ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE (2001)).
31. Jonathan Macey, The Nature of Conflicts of Interest Within the Firm, 31 J. CORP. L. 613,
613 (2006). 
32. Id. at 630 n.74 (citing Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).
33. Although agency costs matter not just for a corporation, but for any firm, I will primarily
use the term “corporation” in this Article because my ultimate proposal is for public corporations.
34. “Horizontal” conflicts, in contrast, focus on conflicts between principals. See Part II.D,
which distinguishes these from vertical conflicts. 
35. See Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?
Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 37 (2005) (citing
Kenneth E. Scott, The Role of Corporate Governance in South Korean Economic Reform, 10 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (1998)).
Avoiding conflicts of interest is a concrete way to force corporate
actors to act beyond their immediate self-interest.  On this, at least,30
corporate scholars and business ethicists agree. Ethicists will want to make
the leap beyond considering the corporation’s self-interest, or, at least,
defining the corporation to include various stakeholders so that it may
serve a larger self-interest, and on that fundamental point, disagreement
will remain. But conflicts of interest provide a starting point, at least, for
bridging the divide that separates the shareholder and stakeholder models
of corporate governance.
C.  A Survey of Vertical Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest are “ubiquitous and inevitable.”  Conflicts arise31
when decisional dynamics create incentives that make it possible that an
individual will succumb to an undesirable bias.  More specifically, this32
Article is concerned with “vertical” biases that exist between principal and
agent. Simply put, these conflicts always involve agents of the
corporation  who are positioned to take from its owners.  All owners fear33 34
unfaithful agents who pay themselves too much, shirk the work that they
are employed to perform, or steal from the corporation; therefore
corporations should logically have developed mechanisms to deal with this
fundamental problem.
A wide spectrum of vertical conflicts of interest exists. On one extreme
lie outright theft and misappropriation of corporate assets; on the other lie
more nuanced actions such as excessive diversification (which protects
managers’ jobs but ignores the interests of already diversified
shareholders) or empire building undertaken more to feed management’s
egos than for the shareholder’s good.  Most organizations instruct35
11
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36. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303(A)(10) (2004) [hereinafter NYSE Manual].
The comment continues: 
A conflict situation can arise when an employee, officer or director takes actions
or has interests that may make it difficult to perform his or her company work
objectively and effectively. Conflicts of interest also arise when an employee,
officer or director, or a member of his or her family, receives improper personal
benefits as a result of his or her position in the company. Loans to, or guarantees
of obligations of, such persons are of special concern.
Id. 
37. Baums & Scott, supra note 35, at 38. A director who is also a common shareholder and
who votes for the corporation to declare a dividend does not engage in self-dealing, because the
benefit she receives as a shareholder is shared pro rata with her fellow shareholders. 
38. This is the reason for title 8, § 144 of the Delaware Code, which provides an avenue for
sanitizing conflicting interest transactions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008); see Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 224–25 (Del. 1976). 
39. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 467 (2008).
40. Corporate transactions with controlling shareholders raise a similar concern, but
controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders is a more complicated topic. For the
sake of simplicity, I will limit this discussion of conflicts to shareholder versus director/officer in
a public corporation, where there is generally (although not always) no single large controlling
shareholder.   
41. Corporations could use the treatment of corporate opportunities under the American Law
Institute’s § 5.05 as a framework. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05 (1994). The idea would be that an individual is protected from liability
for a conflict-of-interest transaction if the transaction is properly disclosed to the board, and the
employees to avoid even the appearance of conflict. For example, the New
York Stock Exchange listing requirements provide that a conflict of
interest exists “when an individual’s private interest interferes in any
way—or even appears to interfere—with the interests of the corporation
as a whole.”  36
The classic vertical conflict involves self-dealing, a situation in which
an individual sits on both sides of the transaction and obtains a special
benefit.  In some cases these transactions may ultimately benefit the37
corporation; for example, a founder may be willing to offer the corporation
a below-market loan in order to help it out in a credit crunch.  Still, an38
employee on both sides of a transaction is necessarily put in a conflict.39
On one hand, as a corporate fiduciary, she must pursue the best bargain for
her principal, the corporation. On the other hand, she will naturally lean
toward favoring her own personal interest in order to extract gain for
herself.  While in the above example, the employee’s loyalty to the40
corporation might prevail over her own self-interest, the corporation
should have procedures in place to identify these types of conflicts and to
ensure that its own interests are protected—for example, by requiring
disclosure to and approval of the board for any self-dealing transaction.41
12
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board approves it in good faith. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a. Without this prior disclosure, the conflicting
transaction would be tainted and the corporation could unwind it. See infra note 68 for further
discussion of the ALI’s treatment of corporate opportunities.
42. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON
MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM 11 (Comm. Print
2007) [hereinafter FFEL REPORT].
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id. at 33–40.
45. Id. at 35, 41 n.42.
46. Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination of
the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357, 374–75 (2003).
47. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1094 n.59 (2003). 
48. Beecher-Monas, supra note 46, at 374. 
Yet many employees in this situation may focus on their “good” motives
in making the loan and not realize that a conflict nevertheless exists.
The 2007 financial aid scandal offers an example of self-dealing.
Several student loan providers used illegal inducements to gain preferred
lender status at financial aid offices at universities around the country.  In42
some cases, school officials received and held shares of one lender,
Student Loan Xpress, at the same time that the lender was ranked
highly—perhaps over-ranked, given its ratings for customer service—on
the school’s lender list.  Because the officials owned stock in the lender43
while working for the schools, placing Student Loan Xpress at the top of
a list of preferred lenders amounted to self-dealing because the additional
business generated would make the officials’ stock shares more valuable.44
This conflict of interest was not disclosed to the universities or to the
student loan consumers.  45
In a famous instance of self-dealing, Enron’s chief financial officer,
Andrew Fastow, owned and managed several special-purpose entities that
helped Enron move transactions off its balance sheet.  Fastow made $4546
million from the partnerships.  In that case, ironically, Fastow followed47
Enron’s internal ethics code; he disclosed his self-dealing to the board of
directors, which waived the conflict of interest and allowed the
transactions to proceed.  This is a case, then, where the proper procedures48
to deal with conflicts of interest were in place, but were sub-optimally
enforced. Rather than approving the waiver as a matter of course, the
board should have probed more deeply into the transactions and ensured
that Enron’s interests were protected (and inquired into why the CFO of
a giant public company should be permitted to engage in such atypical
behavior).  But the board’s ignorance, not of the conflict, but of its
importance, kept it from taking appropriate action.
In a second type of vertical conflict, related-party transactions, the
agent is not on both sides of the transaction, but one closely related to him
13
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49. Vice President & Corporate Secretary, Second Report of the Ad Hoc Group,
4, delivered to the World Bank, R2007-0089 (May 14, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/worldbankadhocgroup-20070514.pdf [hereinafter Ad Hoc Group
Report]. 
50. Id. at 7 (citing Staff Rule 3.01 § 4). 
51. Id. at 10–11, 13. 
52. Gregg Hitt, Terms of Employment: Wolfowitz Memo, Dictating Raises Given to Friend,
Now Haunts Him, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2007, at A1. The letter also contained this language: “I
wish to reiterate [my] deep unhappiness with the whole way of dealing with a situation that I still
believe . . . should have been resolved by my recusal.” Id.
53. Ad Hoc Group Report, supra note 49, at 20–22, 24. Ms. Riza would leave the Bank with
a salary of $180,000 and be guaranteed a promotion upon return in five years. Id. at 20.
54. Greg Hitt & Neil King, Jr., Wolfowitz’s Support Diminishes; The White House Wavers
As World Bank President Continues to Fight for Job, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2007, at A3. 
55. Emily Steel, Ashby Jones, & Douglas Belkin, Press Baron Black Guilty in Fraud Case;
Jury in a Mixed Verdict, Finds Executives Skimmed Millions From Hollinger, WALL ST. J., July
14, 2007, at A3. 
56. Id. 
57. See id.
is. The World Bank/Paul Wolfowitz affair represents one example.
Wolfowitz’s employment contract specifically referenced the World
Bank’s Code of Conduct, which required that he “avoid any conflict of
interest, real or apparent.”  World Bank Staff Employment Principles49
characterize a sexual relationship between a staff member and a direct
report as a “de facto conflict of interest.”  Wolfowitz followed procedure50
by, at the beginning of his tenure as president of the World Bank,
disclosing to the Ethics Committee the existence of a relationship between
him and a current employee, Shaha Riza.  Despite asking to be recused51
from decisions involving Riza, Wolfowitz apparently sent Bank human
resources vice president Xavier Coll a letter “not seen by executive
directors, Ethics Committee or general counsel—dictating terms of Ms.
Riza’s current and future pay.”  The terms included a substantial pay52
raise, which the Ethics Committee approved.  A World Bank53
subcommittee found that these actions violated the Bank’s ethics rules.54
Another example of an interested transaction is the case of Conrad
Black, the former chairman of Hollinger International, Inc., who was
convicted of mail fraud and obstruction of justice in 2007.  Among other55
transgressions, during a sale of former Hollinger newspapers, Black
allegedly “came up with a scheme to approve millions of dollars of
payments to himself and others . . . . The payments were said to be for the
executives’ agreement not to compete with the new owners of the
papers.”  These noncompete payments would have been perfectly56
innocent if they were actually requested by the buyer, and the buyer’s bid
represented the best overall deal for the corporation’s shareholders.57
However, a buyer’s representative testified that it had not asked for the
14
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58. Id.
59. In two subsequent Delaware cases, the Chancery Court warned against such leveraged
buyouts that seem tilted in favor of management. See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d
94, 112–15 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that shareholders are irreparably injured if they are asked to
vote without knowledge of material facts, such as a CEO’s personal financial interests in a potential
merger); In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“When directors bias
the process against one bidder and toward another not in a reasoned effort to maximize advantage
for the stockholders, but to tilt the process toward the bidder more likely to continue current
management, they commit a breach of fiduciary duty.”).
60. FFEL REPORT, supra note 42, at 12–13. 
61. Id. at 28.
62. Id. at 41.
63. Not all companies have this ethical knowledge gap between leadership and lower-level
employees. Wal-Mart, Inc. has a famously rigorous code of ethics that forbids employees from
accepting gifts from vendors. James Bandler & Gary McWilliams, Wal-Mart Chief Bought Ring
From Firm’s Vendor, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2007, at A4. The code came under criticism, however,
after corporate officials invoked it to fire a manager who had accepted gifts, including liquor and
expensive dinners, from suppliers. See id. Wal-Mart’s code requires employees to “‘avoid conflicts
of interest in supplier selection, such as directing business to a supplier owned or managed by a
relative or a friend.’” Gary McWilliams & James Covert, Uncomfortable Suit: Roehm Accuses
Wal-Mart Brass of Ethics Lapses; Fired Executive Claims CEO Gets Sweet Deals from Longtime
Supplier, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2007, at A1. It further provides that employees are not permitted
to “‘have social or other relationships with suppliers, if such relationship would create the
appearance of impropriety or give the perception that business influence is being exerted.’” Id.
Claiming that the corporation had applied a double standard in her case, the employee alleged that
the CEO of the company had also violated the code by purchasing “‘a large pink diamond’” and
“‘a number of yachts’” from a vendor at “preferential prices.” Bandler & McWilliams, supra.
According to Wal-Mart’s court filings, “‘[i]nstead of working solely in Wal-Mart’s
interest,’ . . . Ms. Roehm ‘frequently put her own first. She did not merely fail to avoid conflicts
noncompetes,  making the payments look like bribes paid to Black and58
other insiders to ensure that the buyer’s bid was accepted.59
Corporations address a third example of vertical conflict by prohibiting
employees from receiving gifts, favors, or remuneration from entities that
sell products to the corporation. If an employee favors a particular vendor
not because of quality pricing, or delivery terms, but rather because of
personal gain to the employee, then the corporation is ultimately the loser.
The financial aid lender scandal presents this type of conflict. Reports
include almost comical inducements, including efforts by lenders to
provide financial aid offices with tequila, parties, happy hours, and
birthday cakes, in exchange for elevated “visibility.”  Some lenders60
offered financial aid officers positions on an advisory board, sponsoring
lavish trips for board members.  Others paid consulting fees to financial61
aid officials.  While the financial aid officials did not share the lender’s62
profits as shareholders, the gifts operated as bribes to gatekeepers to
increase revenue. And while the high-level officials clearly knew that such
practices violated the organization’s policies, some of the rank-and-file
employees did not.  63
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of interest, she invited them.’” Louise Story & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Fights Back Over
Firings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at C1. Wal-Mart further alleged that Ms. Roehm explored
career opportunities with the supplier, which “tainted” the process of supplier selection. Id.
64. Richard C. Nolan, The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United
Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 413,
460 (2005).
65. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 33 (2004) (“Individuals are known to
develop beliefs that support positions consistent with their self-interest.”). 
66. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (concluding
that the Disney corporate directors and officers did not breach their fiduciary duties or commit
waste in hiring and subsequently firing Michael Ovitz); Laura M. Holson, Ruling Upholds Disney’s
Payment in Firing of Ovitz, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at A1.
67. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 706–10.
68. The NYSE defines corporate opportunities as (a) “opportunities that are discovered
through the use of corporate property, information, or position; (b) using corporate property,
information, or position for personal gain; and (c) competing with the company.” NYSE Manual,
supra note 36, § 303(A)(10). Delaware case law and the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance have different definitions of what constitutes a corporate opportunity. See
Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 41, § 5.05(b). In the
case of the ALI, whenever a senior executive becomes aware of an opportunity “closely related to
a business in which the corporation is [currently] engaged [in] or [in which it] expects to engage,”
such opportunity is the property of the corporation, and must be disclosed to it. Id. § 5.05(b)(2).
Delaware, on the other hand, employs a balancing test involving numerous factors in assessing
whether a situation constitutes a corporate opportunity. Broz, 673 A.2d at 154–55. 
Compensation decisions present a fourth type of vertical conflict of
interest, particularly when an agent sets his own rate of pay. Perhaps
because of the obviousness of this conflict, executive compensation has
been a focus of scholarship and regulatory interest for years in both
Europe  and the United States,  and corporations deal with64 65
compensation-related conflicts—unlike the other types of conflicts—via
formal internal structures. Most commonly, company policies prohibit the
executive from participating in deliberation on her own
compensation—which would, if allowed, represent self-dealing. These
structural constraints, however, may not always work—as illustrated by
claims made over Disney’s $140-million payment to departing CEO
Michael Ovitz.  In that case, plaintiffs alleged facts suggesting that the66
compensation committee came very close to improperly ceding its
responsibility to negotiate with Ovitz to Ovitz’s friend, then-CEO Michael
Eisner.  “Negotiating” with a corporate representative who is also a good67
friend creates an obvious conflict of interest.
Finally, there is a rich tradition of common law dealing with corporate
opportunities, but it is an area of vertical conflict many employees may not
consider.  The idea is that certain business opportunities presented to the68
agent belong by right to the corporate entity. Although the classic scenario
16
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69. No. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2004).
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id. at *4.
for a corporate opportunity involves someone offering an officer or
director a valuable asset, corporate opportunities can sometimes take
unexpected forms. In 2004, in In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,69
the Delaware Chancery Court recognized a cause of action where plaintiffs
alleged that eBay directors usurped a corporate opportunity by accepting
shares in other companies’ public offerings from Goldman Sachs, an
investment bank.  Plaintiffs argued that Goldman Sachs had provided70
valuable initial public offering allocations (virtually guaranteed to go up
in value given market conditions at the time) to eBay directors in order to
encourage them to steer eBay business towards Goldman.  Because eBay71
was in the business of investing in securities, and was financially able to
do so, the court found that the Goldman IPO allocations constituted a
corporate opportunity that the directors should have offered to the
corporation.72
D.  Distinguishing Horizontal Conflicts
“Horizontal” conflicts exist between two principals. A common
example involves the situation in which one attorney represents two clients
who have conflicting interests. Although horizontal conflicts exist within
corporations, they are not the focus of this Article. A brief discussion of
horizontal conflicts, however, may help clarify the nature of the vertical
conflicts on which this Article focuses.
1.  Professional Conflicts 
For lawyers, the phrase “conflict of interest” naturally conjures up
cases in which the quality of an attorney’s representation of a current
client is threatened by her ties to another current or former client.
Although these conflicts could result in gain to a law firm (if, for example,
the firm were to favor the interests of a deep-pocketed repeat client while
ostensibly representing a less wealthy opponent), the primary concern with
client conflicts is not an agent taking from his principal, but rather a lack
of zealous representation for a particular client. A law firm, like any
organization, may suffer from vertical conflicts of interest; the managing
partner, for example, might insist on the firm employing her irresponsible
son as office manager. In general, however, law firm conflicts are not
principal/agent conflicts, but rather horizontal conflicts between the firm’s
interests and its duties to represent each client zealously. 
17
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73. Richard M. Weber, Jr., Subtle Hazards, 124 BANKING L.J. 324, 335–38 (2007).
74. Obviously, in hindsight it was bad for the firm as a whole to turn a blind eye to the audit
function for the sake of the consulting business. But at the time the decision seemed like a positive
one for Arthur Andersen. George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting
Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1330 (2003). 
75. Macey, supra note 31, at 613. 
76. Id. at 613–14.
77. See id. at 617. 
78. Id. at 615–19.
79. State corporate law provides the sole exception. The distinction I draw here is that
conflict-of-interest rules are internally focused: any violations of the rules result in damages paid
to the corporation (via a derivative suit), not to a third party. 
The Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals presented a similar
horizontal conflict. Although Arthur Andersen’s professional mandate was
to audit its client’s financial statements and certify them as accurate,
because of the structure of partner compensation and the amount of
revenues from consulting fees, there was strong pressure to sign off on
Enron’s financials for the sake of non-audit revenue.  Although the73
particular partners in charge of the Enron and WorldCom accounts
benefitted from this, there were also benefits to Arthur Andersen as a
whole from the increased revenues from these clients.74
2.  Conflicts Within the Firm
Jonathan Macey asserts: “[A] strong argument can be made that
corporate law does very little of much value other than regulating conflicts
within the firm.”  As Macey points out, however, conflicts occur within75
the firm both between principal and agent, and between the various
constituents of a firm.  The former is our concern here, not the latter.76
Sometimes, for example, the interests of credit holders and shareholders
will conflict: creditors and shareholders will have different answers to the
question of when a firm should liquidate.  Creditors will prefer the more77
certain payout, and shareholders, as the residual claimants, will tolerate
more risk if it generates the possibility of a higher payout.  While these78
conflicts between constituents are real and inevitable, they present a
different question from the simpler agency cost problem this Article
explores. They present another horizontal, inter-principal conflict,
requiring the examination of the many principals that make up a
corporation, but that do not act as its agents.
Having distinguished horizontal conflicts, we can return to our focus,
vertical conflicts. Their unifying theme is that all vertical conflicts, in
different ways, deal with the internal governance rules of the corporation.
Corporations choose to prohibit some or all of this behavior not because
of the pressure of external laws,  but because it makes for a more efficient79
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80. Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley,
and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2125–26 (2003)
[hereinafter The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics]; see Joshua A. Newberg,
Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L.
governance structure that ultimately should benefit the corporation as a
whole. As discussed in the next Part, conflicts are generally dealt with in
a corporate code of conduct. After describing codes of conduct, this
Article will explain the failings of the current approach to policing
conflicts of interest.
III.  THE PROBLEMATIC CURRENT APPROACH
Current approaches to officer conflicts of interest are wholly
inadequate. Because many of these approaches center on codes of conduct,
this Part begins by describing the different kinds of provisions that these
codes contain: not only prohibitions against conflicts of interest, but also
provisions for compliance with external laws like antitrust or
environmental laws, and aspirational provisions concerning the
environment, the local community, or similar topics. The fact that codes
contain so much may contribute to the dilution of the impact of conflicts
provisions, which are central to internal corporate governance.
Next, this Part describes the problems with current conflicts
approaches. The Department of Justice and Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines are concerned with compliance with external laws. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act focuses on disclosure of waivers of the code of
conduct, but this requirement may have had the perverse incentive of
weakening codes of conduct. This Part describes the first-ever empirical
study of these disclosures in SEC filings, and that preliminary data suggest
that the disclosures of waivers fail to provide meaningful information to
shareholders. State law focuses only on dealing with conflicts once they
arise, but provides no way to identify the conflicts beforehand, and
litigation by shareholders is hobbled by structural constraints like the
business judgment rule and the limitations for bringing a derivative suit.
None of these mechanisms—not federal compliance, not disclosure
regulation, not state law—address the common core of these corporate
scandals: the internal failure to control conflicts of interest that causes a
corporate employee to elevate his own interests above those of the
corporation, and the possibility that this failure is the product of ignorance.
A.  Codes of Conduct: Where Corporations Locate Conflicts Policies
                (and a Whole Lot More)          
Corporate codes of conduct are “corporate governance rules that a
company generates voluntarily, as opposed to rules imposed by law.”80
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REV. 253, 257–58 (2005). For a general history of these codes, see Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra
note 4, at 1574–600.
81. The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics, supra note 80, at 2136.
82. Id. at 2137. Wal-Mart’s firing of Julie Roehm for alleged violations of its ethics rules,
and her fiery retaliation in court that the CEO had also violated the ethics policy by receiving a
diamond and several yachts from suppliers at discounted prices, illustrates both this mechanism and
a potential pitfall of it. See Bandler & McWilliams, supra note 63.
83. Newberg, supra note 80, at 260; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1603.
84. The SEC’s definition of a “code of ethics” is illustrative of this amalgamation. It uses the
term to describe written standards that are “reasonably designed” to prevent “wrongdoing,” and also
to promote:
(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or
apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships;
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in reports and
documents that a [company] files with, or submits to, the Commission and in other
public communications made by the [company];
(3) Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations;
(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an appropriate
person or persons identified in the code; and
(5) Accountability for adherence to the code. 
SEC Code of Ethics Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2008). The first prong is what I would term a
true ethics code provision, but the second two are compliance provisions. The second is concerned
specifically with compliance with securities laws, and the third with general compliance with all
applicable laws, rules, and regulations. 
These codes of conduct generate information for the board and senior
management concerning potential problems with employees.81
Furthermore, particularly at the senior management level, the codes are a
way to discharge employees without triggering expensive severance
payments.82
The most common subject of corporate codes of conduct is the
avoidance of conflicts of interest.  However, codes of conduct contain not83
only conflict provisions, but also other ethics and compliance provisions.84
Separating out these three different strands will enable us to focus more
closely on the conflicts provisions of the codes of conduct.
1.  Compliance Contrasted with Conflict
Although compliance provisions are not the focus of this Article, it will
be helpful to discuss these provisions to delineate the boundaries of
conflicts provisions and to contrast existing enforcement mechanisms.
Although the two are often conflated, conflicts of interest rules differ from
compliance provisions in that corporations have independent reasons for
wanting to implement conflict-of-interest rules—the desire to minimize
agency costs. Compliance provisions are voluntary provisions adopted by
20
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85. Many corporations also have separate codes and policies to ensure compliance with equal
employment opportunity law, and there is a rich literature regarding compliance efforts and results.
See Krawiec, supra note 7, at 493–94. However, because these policies are so area-specific, they
are less relevant to ethics codes than are general compliance codes, and this Article therefore will
not discuss them. For a discussion of the application of various liability regimes to the problem of
compliance, see Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 691. 
86. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1563.
87. Id. at 1563–65. The customary quotation is that the corporation acts only through its
agents, and has “‘no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked.’” Id. at 1562 (attributing the
quote to Baron Thurlow, an eighteenth-century British jurist). To limit the scope of the doctrine,
corporations are only liable for actions committed by employees within the scope of their
employment. Id. at 1565. 
88. Id. at 1570; see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035,
1044 (2008) (discussing, among other things, the origins of corporate criminal liability). 
89. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1573.
90. The United States Sentencing Commission promulgated the Guidelines in 1991. Leonard
Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45,
48 (2006). The courts applied the guidelines as mandatory until United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005). Id. at 49. It is unclear whether Booker applies to corporate defendants; if it does, then
the Guidelines would become advisory only. Id. Even still, they would likely continue to play a role
in corporate governance. Id.
91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2007); see also id. at intro. cmt.
92. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM
OPINION FOR THE HEADS OF DEP’T COMPONENTS U.S. ATTORNEYS: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter THOMPSON MEMO]. 
corporations to ensure compliance with externally imposed laws.  85
The traditional doctrine of respondeat superior makes corporations
vicariously liable for the actions of their employees.  Without respondeat86
superior, corporations would fail to internalize the costs of doing business;
they could avoid payments to tort victims by claiming that their agents
acted without authority, and consequently that the agents alone should be
held responsible.  Corporate criminal liability borrows directly from the87
doctrine of respondeat superior.  Just as in the tort context, so in the88
corporate criminal context, the doctrine makes the corporation responsible
for criminal acts performed by its employees for its own benefit, forcing
the corporation to internalize the costs of crimes committed on its behalf,
and to monitor and train its employees to prevent them.  89
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide another mechanism
for motivating corporations to undertake compliance programs.90
Corporate defendants can reduce the amount of criminal fines levied
against them if they have an “effective compliance and ethics program.”91
Furthermore, a January 20, 2003 DOJ memorandum from Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson focusing on the factors militating for
and against federal prosecution of business organizations  and its92
successor memoranda issued by Paul J. McNulty and Mark Filip (the
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93. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM
OPINION FOR THE HEADS OF DEP’T COMPONENTS U.S. ATTORNEYS: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter MCNULTY MEMO].
94. Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 9-28.800, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
95. Id. § VII; THOMPSON MEMO, supra note 92, § VII. The SEC’s Framework for
Cooperation, in contrast, focuses mostly on the misconduct at issue and its detection, inquiring only
generally as to “[w]hat compliance procedures were in place to prevent the misconduct now
uncovered . . . and [w]hy did those procedures fail to stop or inhibit the wrongful conduct?” Cristie
L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 786 (2005)
(citing Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions,
Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm).
96. THOMPSON MEMO, supra note 92, § VII. Corporations should (1) communicate the
compliance code to employees through periodic training, (2) put monitoring and auditing systems
in place, (3) implement a reporting system so that employees can report violations without fear of
retaliation, and (4) task high-level personnel with overseeing the compliance structure. Krawiec,
supra note 7, at 496. Although they are only guidelines, the Thompson factors (unchanged, for our
purposes, by the McNulty and Filip Memos) “have become the canonical text for assessing
corporate cooperation.” Griffin, supra note 7, at 319.
97. Griffin, supra note 7, at 340–41 (“[Corporate fraud’s] harm is great, the charges are
complex, and government resources are stretched thin . . . . [T]he organizational guidelines were
adopted in part on the theory that strong private corporate compliance efforts would augment
limited government resources. Unraveling the threads of an intricate corporate fraud scheme
without extensive cooperation is also a daunting challenge, and a direct approach to potential
employee cooperators may be constrained by ethical rules prohibiting contact with employee
witnesses without the consent of the company.”).
98. See, e.g., MCNULTY MEMO, supra note 93, at 14 (“The Department has no formal
guidelines for corporate compliance programs.”). 
99. See Baer, supra note 88, at 1050 (taking a harsher view and noting that “[the criminal
justice compliance system] provides the government with a method of screening potential
defendants, maintaining control over business entities, and leveraging its prosecution of individuals.
Moreover, because it leaves the specific details of internal compliance largely to the private sector,
the system creates an impression of flexibility and private initiative.”). 
“McNulty Memo”  and the “Filip Memo” ) stress not only the93 94
cooperation of a corporation with a federal investigation once it has begun,
but also the implementation of a corporate compliance program
beforehand.  Corporations cannot rely on a mere “paper program,” but95
must establish well-designed and comprehensive compliance programs.96
The starting point for these sorts of regulatory moves, corporate crime,
is too large a problem with which to tax limited government resources.97
Both the Guidelines and the DOJ memos purposefully do not dictate
specific provisions or make specific requirements for corporations to
undertake.  Instead, they create incentives for corporations to police and98
monitor themselves, and to report any violations to the government.  This99
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100. Bowman, supra note 7, at 678. 
101. Newberg, supra note 80, at 263–64. 
102. Id. at 263. 
103. Id. at 257.
104. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 400 (2005).
105. Id.
106. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 918 (2007). 
107. For example, in 1998, Nike consumer Marc Kasky sued Nike, Inc. regarding company
statements about working conditions in its offshore factories. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247
(Cal. 2002). Among other allegations, Kasky claimed that Nike violated its own vendor policies,
under which Nike “assumed responsibility for its subcontractors' compliance with applicable local
laws and regulations concerning minimum wage, overtime, occupational health and safety, and
arrangement presents a “carrot and stick” approach, where corporations
are rewarded for having effective programs in place.  100
Enforcement is left to the corporation’s discretion. Generally, larger
companies will have an ethics or compliance officer, sometimes
coordinated by in-house counsel.  Many codes require employees to101
report suspected violations.  Enforcement of compliance provisions is102
relevant for conflicts purposes in two ways. First, enforcement of
compliance provisions at least pays lip service to enforcing a corporation’s
code of conduct (including its conflicts provisions) generally. Second,
though often termed a form of “self-regulation,” compliance provisions
involve a de facto form of government by delegation. Such provisions
involve corporations in monitoring for violations of external laws and
enforcing penalties against wrongdoers, generally by turning them over to
external regulators. In contrast, conflicts provisions—which involve self-
imposed limits designed for the specific purpose of reducing agency
costs—operate in a very different way.
2.  Aspirational Ethical Provisions in Codes of Conduct
Business ethicists focus on the positive duties of corporate citizens to
act ethically, and how corporations can incorporate these duties into their
codes of conduct. Some of these codes are brief “corporate credos” or
“values statements,” articulating principles that guide the conduct of the
company’s business.  These voluntary principles, standards, or guidelines103
can be “broad and aspirational” or “more detailed and operational in
nature.”  They generally focus on labor rights, human rights, consumer104
protection, anti-corruption, and environmental concerns.  One scholar105
has termed the environmental requirements imposed via private contract
by large corporations onto their suppliers the “new Wal-Mart effect.”106
Third parties have made some efforts to enforce these voluntary policies,
but they have largely failed.107
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environmental protection.” Id. at 247–48. In another case, the International Labor Rights Fund sued
Wal-Mart, Inc. for failing to enforce provisions of its code of conduct relating to fair-labor practices
of its suppliers. See Retail Brief—Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: Group Files Suit Challenging Enforcement
of Conduct Code, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at A16.
108. Murphy, supra note 104, at 395–96 (“[G]overnments in the developed world resist
regulating MNCs abroad and, if pressed to issue regulations, might set lower standards than may
be achieved in voluntary codes. Furthermore, civil society groups are aware that governments in
the developing world often lack the capacity or the will to regulate MNCs. Indeed, authoritarian
or non-democratic regimes may be uninterested in addressing broad social concerns.”); see also
Katherine Kenny, Comment, Code or Contract: Whether Wal-Mart’s Code of Conduct Creates a
Contractual Obligation Between Wal-Mart and the Employees of its Foreign Suppliers, 27 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 453, 455 (2007) (examining whether corporate codes of conduct are binding on
foreign suppliers and their employees, or merely voluntary, non-contractual devices).
109. Newberg, supra note 80, at 290–91. 
110. See supra Part II.C. 
111. Id.
112. Corporate Conflicts of Interest, American-Style, 23 ACC DOCKET 98, 98 (2005). 
Some corporate social responsibility advocates focus on transnational
relationships with suppliers as a way to enforce higher standards, given
weak international law and the fact that some developing countries choose
not to regulate multinational corporations or their domestic partners.108
Nike, The Gap, Levi Strauss, Reebok, and Mattel have responded to
scandals involving labor conditions in overseas factories by implementing
voluntary codes of conduct that apply to their suppliers and
subcontractors.  109
Conflicts provisions properly understood, then, are the provisions of
the code of conduct where the corporation is not responding to external
laws, but rather implementing internal governance measures that try to
prevent its employees from misappropriating corporate assets.  They110
attempt to address the issues of self-dealing, related-party transactions,
relationships with vendors, and corporate opportunities.  Topics111
commonly dealt with include permissibility of gifts; policies for leaving
and returning to employment with the government, a customer, or
supplier; selection of vendors; sales; or travel and entertainment
expenses.112
Thus conflicts provisions, although so crucial to corporate governance,
are sandwiched between compliance and aspirational provisions in
corporate codes. It is up to individual corporations to emphasize this most
fundamental part of their corporate codes. Yet, as the next Part will
explain, most of the policing mechanisms corporations face focus on
external compliance, not internal conflicts of interest.
24
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113. Bowman, supra note 7, at 678.
114. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
115. Id. at 970. Caremark’s standard was adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone
v. Ritter, 911 A. 2d 362 (Del. 2006).
116. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
117. Id. at 971. (“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”). For
further discussion of Delaware’s treatment of the duty to monitor, see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
369–70 (Del. 2006) and In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 755–56
(Del. Ch. 2005).
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2007).
B.  Problems with Current Means of Enforcing Codes of Conduct
1.  Enforcement via Compliance: An Imperfect Tool
Compliance enforcement largely takes the form of “carrot and stick.”113
The DOJ memos promise less chance of prosecution, and the Guidelines
provide for reduced penalties, if corporations put systems in place and
report infractions to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,  a famous Delaware114
case that appeared to establish an affirmative duty to monitor compliance
systems, increased the pressure to create compliance enforcement
mechanisms.  The opinion alluded to the Guidelines in articulating a115
board’s duty to
assur[e] . . . that information and reporting systems exist in
the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board,
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments
concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and
its business performance.  116
However, as many commentators have observed, the actual standard for
proving liability under Caremark is “quite high.”117
Although there is some mention of ethics programs in the Guidelines,
their intent is to regulate compliance,  not conflicts. Crucially for my118
purposes, although the language of the Guidelines refers to a compliance
and ethics program, the operational language focuses solely on compliance
with external law. So, for example, although the description of a
qualifying program requires that the organization not only “prevent and
detect criminal conduct,” but also “otherwise promote an organizational
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
25
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119. Id. 
120. See, e.g., id. § 8B2.1(b)(1) (“The organization shall establish standards and procedures
to prevent and detect criminal conduct.”); id. § 8B2.1(b)(5) (“The organization shall take
reasonable steps—(A) to ensure that the organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed,
including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct; [and] . . . (C) to have and publicize
a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the
organization’s employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual
criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.” (emphasis added)); id. § 8B2.1(b)(6) (“The
organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and enforced consistently
throughout the organization through . . . appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal
conduct and for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.” (emphasis
added)); id. § 8B2.1(b)(7) (“After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take
reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar
criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the organization’s compliance
and ethics program” (emphasis added)). Only the section on employment of “substantial authority
personnel” refers to the application of an effective compliance and ethics program to more than just
criminal activity, requiring that the organization use “reasonable efforts” not to place an individual
who “has engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance
and ethics program” into a substantial authority personnel position. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(3) (emphasis
added). “Substantial authority” is defined in an earlier part of the statute as those “who within the
scope of their authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of an
organization.” Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(c).
121. Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate
Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 958 (2006).
122. Id. Donald Langevoort also suggests that the costs of setup (undoubtedly more of an issue
for internal controls than for a code of ethics, although enforcement mechanisms such as a helpline
may prove costly) may explain failure to put these systems in place, or, intriguingly, it may be a
question of path dependency: more extensive systems might make more sense later in a
corporation’s life cycle, rather than earlier, but sometimes “the original structure [may stay] in
place too long without modification simply because the managers are paying attention to more
pressing matters.” Id. at 958–59.
123. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 269. 
with the law,”  the minimal requirements set forth in the following119
sections all focus on the detection and prevention of criminal conduct.120
The ethical conduct language seems tacked on, serving no operative
purpose.
Given this emphasis on compliance, conflicts provisions may not be
put in place at all, or may exist in only a flawed form. Agency costs can
explain a failure to implement conflicts provisions or internal controls in
the first place; if the agents in charge are already unfaithful, they will be
loath to put monitoring systems  or a code of ethics in place that will121
only constrain their actions.  Lawrence Cunningham describes how,122
thanks in part to lawyers and their love of processes and desire to avoid
legal liability, internal controls (which should address, among other
concerns, conflicts of interest) morphed from positive means to help a
corporation meet its objectives to processes focused on preventing
“undesired events” from occurring.123
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124. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2008).
125. “Related person” is defined as a director or officer of the corporation, a current nominee
for director, or their immediate family members; or a holder of more than 5% of the corporation’s
securities, or their immediate family members. Id. § 229.404(a) instruction 1.
126. Id. §§ 229.404(a)–(b). The NASDAQ keys its conflicts requirement off of this SEC
regulation:
Each issuer shall conduct appropriate review and oversight of all related party
transactions for potential conflict of interest situations on an ongoing basis by the
company’s audit committee or another independent body of the board of directors.
For purposes of this rule, the term “related party transaction” shall refer to
transactions required to be disclosed pursuant to SEC Regulation S-K, Item 404.
NASDAQ Manual § 4350(h) (2008), available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/NASDAQTools/
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain
%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F. 
127.  Treviño et al., supra note 4, at 131.
128.  Id. at 135.
129.  Id.
130.  Id. at 131; see also David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1792 (2007); Jason Stansbury
& Bruce Barry, Ethics Programs and the Paradox of Control, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 239, 246 (2007).
131. See Stansbury & Barry, supra note 130, at 252.
Government regulation directly touches some conflicts of interest,
converting them into issues of compliance as well as conflict. One subset
of conflicts of interest—those involving related-party transactions—must
be disclosed under Item 404 of Regulation S-K.  For transactions124
involving more than $120,000, where a related person  has a “direct or125
indirect material” interest, companies must disclose the name of the
related person, the relationship, the amount of the related person’s interest
in the transaction, and the corporation's process of review, approval, or
ratification of the transaction.  126
Criticisms of the current compliance-based approach abound. Business
ethicists fault a misplaced emphasis on rules for the failures of
enforcement. Much of the larger ethics literature focuses not on issue-
specific positive ethical conduct, but instead on the need to move from a
focus on narrow rules to a broader focus on corporate culture and values.
A prominent study found that “specific characteristics of the formal ethics
or compliance program matter less than broader perceptions of the
program’s orientation toward values and ethical aspirations.”  The127
programs that lawyers favor are what the literature calls “compliance
approach[es],” which focus “primarily on preventing, detecting, and
punishing violations of the law.”  In contrast, values-based approaches128
“aim[] to define organizational values and encourage employee
commitment to ethical aspirations.”  Studies have found the values129
approach to be more effective, although much depends on the culture of
the organization.  The corporation should avoid the perception that130
management is just trying to protect itself from liability.131
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132. Interestingly, although most of the NYSE requirements for listed companies’ codes of
ethics are negative proscriptions (as one would expect from an entity that provides general
governance requirements to for-profit corporations), there is one exception: the NYSE wants
corporations to have codes that encourage “fair dealing” with its “customers, suppliers, competitors
and employees.” NYSE Manual, supra note 36, § 303A.10. This goes farther into the positive
ethical terrain than does the traditional duty of loyalty. It elaborates that “[n]one should take unfair
advantage of anyone through manipulation, concealment, abuse of privileged information,
misrepresentation of material facts, or any other unfair-dealing practice.” Id.
133. Krawiec, supra note 7, at 487; see Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1630–31.
134. Krawiec, supra note 7, at 491–92; see also Ford, supra note 95, at 791–92 (“Compliance
serves an insurance function against zealous prosecutorial action, and firms purchase only the
amount of compliance required to shift liability away from the firm. It would not be in a firm’s
interest to purchase too-effective compliance structures that could uncover wrongdoing that would
otherwise remain undiscovered. Firms may be tempted to follow compliance requirements in a
minimal, even cynical, way.” (footnote omitted)).
135. Krawiec, supra note 7, at 511 (“Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in corporate
America and the insistence by many legal compliance professionals on their importance as a
deterrence tool, little evidence exists to support the theory that ethics codes modify employee
behavior.”). Although Krawiec uses the term “ethics code,” her argument centers on compliance,
and she does not make the compliance/ethics distinction that this Article makes. Krawiec observes
that studies finding a significant relationship between ethics codes and employee behavior have
methodological flaws. Id. 
136. John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 310, 317 (2004) (“The so-called ‘carrot and stick’ approach never had much
carrot to it, however. If a company adopted a compliance program and self-reported violations, it
received no guarantee of leniency. On the other hand, the failure to pursue the carrot ‘voluntarily’
virtually guaranteed being hit with the stick in the event of a corporate conviction.” (footnote
omitted)).
137. Bowman, supra note 7, at 684. 
138. Id. at 679.
Corporate scholars, on the other hand, focus mainly on compliance and
enforcement, rather than on the content of the codes.  Compliance codes,132
and ethics codes to the extent that they are treated as the same, have been
criticized as mere “window-dressing.”  Kimberly Krawiec questions the133
usefulness of these mechanisms when “the indicia of an effective
compliance system are easily mimicked and true effectiveness is difficult
for courts and regulators to determine, particularly ex post.”  Indeed,134
several studies appear to cast doubt on these codes’ ability to change
employee behavior.135
There is even reason to doubt the underlying premise that compliance
efforts pay off for corporations—i.e., that the “carrot” exists at all.  Frank136
Bowman III revealed that as of 2004 (after thirteen years under the
Guidelines) only three corporations had received a reduction in fines
because of the effective compliance factor.  Nevertheless, these137
incentives have spawned an industry focused on advising corporations in
the design, implementation, and enforcement of compliance
mechanisms.  If one counts not only the direct costs of internal controls,138
but also the expense associated with “false complacency,” the cost
28
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139. See Cunningham, supra note 7, at 305 (“In addition to direct costs are the costs associated
with creating false complacency. The comfort-sense of systems, controls, and audits obscures the
real underlying risks.”). 
140. Bowman, supra note 7, at 680–81; Krawiec, supra note 7, at 489. Conscious and
unconscious biases lead lawyers, for example, to overstate legal risks. See Krawiec, supra note 7,
at 529. Enterprise indictments are enormously threatening for corporations, not only because of
reputational effects, but also because indicted organizations cannot contract with any federal
agencies, and may lose federal aid or licensees or permits. Baer, supra note 88, at 1062. 
141. Bowman, supra note 7, at 687. 
142. See id. at 680–81; Krawiec, supra note 7, at 489. 
143. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 269.
144. Id. at 270–71. 
145. Id. at 270.
146. See id. at 304. 
147. Krawiec, supra note 7, at 511–12. 
148. Stansbury & Barry, supra note 130, at 239–40.
149. See Ford, supra note 95, at 791; Newberg, supra note 80, at 267 n.83. Common
methodological techniques, such as relying on hypothetical problems in lab settings or relying on
self-reported instances of observed unethical conduct, are problematic. Krawiec, supra note 7, at
511–12.
multiplies.  Lawyers, accountants, compliance consultants, internal139
compliance and human resources personnel, and other specialists try to
convince companies that by implementing their programs, those firms can
avoid prosecution or greatly decrease any potential fine.  Although the140
efficacy of these programs is unclear, there is no doubt that they are
expensive.  141
Corporations generally rely on the compliance industry to put in place
controls that monitor conflicts. Legal scholars like Lawrence Cunningham,
Kimberly Krawiec, and Donald Langevoort discuss the rent-seeking
behavior of the compliance industry, which justifies its existence by
magnifying the benefits of compliance and the perils of failing to institute
all available measures to protect against noncompliance.  Cunningham142
writes that lawyers, in particular, over-rely on these controls.  Rather143
than understanding them (as accountants do) as risk assessments, they
expect controls to prevent virtually all problems.  Compounding the144
issue, not all problems can be measured reliably. Rather than addressing
these unmeasurables, however, there is a trend towards controls that can
be audited or can be measured, rather than toward controls that actually
work.  These controls thus induce a false sense of complacency, and145
elevate the control as an end in and of itself.  146
As discussed, conflicts-of-interest provisions are contained in corporate
codes of conduct. Some studies suggest that these codes alone are
ineffective in changing employee behavior.  A major drawback of ethics147
programs is that by asserting control, they hamper an employee’s ability
to make her own moral judgment.  Furthermore, there are problems148
associated with measuring ethics and the effectiveness of ethics codes.149
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150. Bowman, supra note 7, at 679 & n.42.
151. Stansbury & Barry, supra note 130, at 253. 
152. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1645. 
153. Id.; see Treviño et al., supra note 4, at 134.
154. See Stansbury & Barry, supra note 130, at 252.
155. See id. at 254.
156. Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley refers to a code that only applies to senior financial
officers: the principal financial officers, comptroller or principal accounting officer, or individuals
performing these functions. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006)). The SEC rules added the “principal executive officer,”
reasoning that CEOs should “be held ‘to at least the same standards of ethical conduct’ as senior
financial officers.” Newberg, supra note 80, at 277 (quoting Disclosure Required by Sections 406
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5118 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm). 
157. For these purposes, ethics provisions are written standards that are “reasonably designed”
to prevent “wrongdoing”, and also to promote: “Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical
handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships.”
17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2008). Interestingly, the proposed rule contained an elaboration on
conflicts of interest, requiring that an ethics code promote “[a]voidance of conflicts of interest,
including disclosure to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code of any material
transaction or relationship that reasonably could be expected to give rise to such a conflict.”
The current regime pressures corporations to install ethics or
compliance officers.  The codes then instruct employees to contact the150
legal department or ethics office with any concerns.  This model151
presupposes, however, that businesspeople are able to identify a potential
conflict in the first place. Studies on hotlines established in corporations
have shown that many of the calls are not whistleblowing at all.  Instead,152
the callers are asking for guidance as to what is appropriate and what is
not.  A basic ignorance exists as to what rises to the level of conflict.153 154
Business ethicists also cite the danger of creating ethics experts that make
individuals less responsible for their own decisions.155
So compliance programs fail conflicts enforcement on two
fronts—focus and efficacy. First they do not focus on ethics; their purview
is preventing violations of external law. But the solution may not simply
be to include ethics more robustly in the scope of compliance measures,
because the efficacy of compliance systems themselves is far from clear.
Many compliance measures are open to charges of window-dressing. The
DOJ memos and the Guidelines notwithstanding, non-disclosure-based
federal regulation of conflicts lacks real effect. 
2.  Perverse Incentives of Sarbanes-Oxley: Theory and Evidence
As seen in the prior section, federal enforcement of conflicts provisions
has generally been an afterthought. The only direct federal regulation
comes from § 406 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, which required the
SEC to promulgate rules regarding disclosure of codes of ethics for senior
management.  The SEC’s definition of a “code of ethics” combines both156
compliance and ethics provisions.  The SEC’s rules require that public157
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Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act
Release No. 8177, Exchange Act Release No. 47235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 24, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm [hereinafter Disclosure Required Release]. The SEC
eliminated it as redundant given the first prong of the definition. Id. 
158. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a) (2008).
159. Id. Joshua Newberg did not find a single instance of corporations electing not to disclose
a code of ethics and providing an explanation why not. Newberg, supra note 80, at 285 n.170. 
160. 17 C.F.R § 229.406(c).
161. Id. § 229.406(d). 
162. The NYSE requires listed companies to adopt and disclose a code of business conduct
and ethics for directors, officers and employees, and to promptly disclose any waivers of the code
for directors or executive officers. NYSE Manual, supra note 36, § 303(A)(10). The NASDAQ
merely requires that listed companies adopt a code of conduct that complies with the requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations. NASDAQ Manual, supra note 126, § 4350(n). 
163. See The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics, supra note 80, at 2135–36.
164. See id. at 2136.
165. Bandler & McWilliams, supra note 63.
166. The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics, supra note 80, at 2135–38 (“In
light of the new disclosure requirements, general counsel may advise the boards of public
companies to draft very narrow codes to avoid ever having any waivers to disclose. The aversion
to public disclosure stems from the concern that shareholders and regulators will not give due
consideration to the beneficial aspects of otherwise prohibited activities that receive waivers, and
corporations disclose whether the company has adopted a code of ethics
that applies to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and
principal accounting officer or comptroller.  If the corporation does not158
have such a code of ethics, it is required to explain why not.  159
The SEC required further disclosure, as well. First, the code itself must
be disclosed, either (1) as an exhibit to the annual report, (2) by posting the
code of ethics on its website, having indicated this in its annual report
along with the corporation’s Internet address, or (3) by providing it,
without charge, to any person upon request.  Thereafter, any amendments160
to the code, or waivers of the code for specific transactions or matters,
must either be disclosed on a Form 8-K or, if the company has disclosed
its intention to do so in its last annual report, it may disclose waivers and
amendments to the code on its website.  NYSE and the NASDAQ have161
similar disclosure requirements for listed companies.162
Along with the generalized fear that compliance codes and corporate
codes of conduct are mere window-dressing, there is a more specialized
concern that the disclosure requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley have had the
unintended effect of causing corporations to weaken their ethics codes.163
Absent Sarbanes-Oxley, a corporation might want to apply a strict ethics
code to its senior managers.  For example, Wal-Mart has a reputation for164
a rigorous code of ethics for all employees, prohibiting any transaction
with vendors.  But, presuming that a corporation would like to preserve165
some flexibility in the application of the code, the fact that all waivers for
senior managers must now be disclosed might incline it to soften the
language of the code, constricting the universe of prohibition, so that there
will be less exposure for failure to disclose a waiver.  Indeed, a166
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consequently, that well-informed decisions to grant waivers will be perceived negatively in the
market and, even worse, second-guessed in litigation when hindsight proves those business
decisions to be poor ones.” (footnotes omitted)). 
167. Russell J. Bruemmer & Leslie Sturtevant, The Influence of Corporate Governance and
Codes of Conduct on Effective Compliance Programs, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSTITUTE
2004, at 129, 147 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1418, 2004). The
authors do go on to note that “the code of ethics should not be drafted solely with minimizing
waivers in mind, or the code may risk running afoul of the SEC, NYSE, and NASDAQ substantive
requirements.” Id. 
168. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1643. Such criticism resulted in the well-
publicized Wal-Mart/Roehm dispute where Wal-Mart fired Roehm for having a personal
relationship with a subordinate and receiving gifts, “including liquor and lavish dinners[,]” from
suppliers. Bandler & McWilliams, supra note 63. Roehm responded by suing the company,
claiming that it applied a double standard and that Wal-Mart’s CEO had also received gifts from
vendors. Id.
169. The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics, supra note 80, at 2136, 2140.
(“Companies will include only the bare minimum needed to comply with the SEC's suggested
topics for a code, and the public filing of codes will not matter because investors will be unable to
distinguish one vague, boilerplate code from another.”). 
170. Newberg, supra note 80, at 281.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 284. 
173. At least one publication has recommended posting the code on the company’s website,
because it is easier to amend. See Corporate Conflicts of Interest, American-Style, supra note 112,
Practising Law Institute publication counsels that “the less frequently a
[c]ompany needs to grant waivers, the better.”  Having a code in place167
and failing to enforce it may well be worse than having no code at all,
because management could be seen as openly flouting its own rules.168
Thus, § 406’s goal of increasing transparency may be perversely undercut
by the Act itself.169
Perhaps, however, this concern is overstated. It is unclear whether
failure to disclose a waiver, for example, would really increase a
corporation’s liability risks because investors may have a cause of action
based on the undisclosed underlying behavior. For example, it is true that,
had § 406 been in place, Enron would have had to disclose the board-
approved waivers of its code of ethics that allowed Andrew Fastow to own
special-purpose entities in transactions with Enron.  Yet as Joshua170
Newberg points out, failure to disclose these interested transactions and
Fastow’s role in them also seems to be a material omission, so that “a Rule
10b-5 claim might well exist . . . even without the added disclosure
obligation created by § 406.”171
Given the window-dressing debate, it would be quite useful to be able
to quantify the number of waivers from their ethics codes that companies
have disclosed. According to Newberg, the change to ethics codes in
response to § 406 has been “relatively modest.”  Unfortunately, because172
the SEC gave companies the option of website disclosure, a study of 8-K
filings alone cannot conclusively answer the question of the number of
waivers disclosed.  Given this inherent limitation, I conducted a survey173
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at 98.
174. Study details and results on file with the author.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter Am.
Capital 8-K]; Nat’l Coal Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Nat’l Coal
8-K].
178. Am. Capital 8-K. Rule 10b5-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 permits such plans
which, if set up while an insider has no knowledge of material non-public information, should
shield him or her from insider trading charges. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2006); Employment of
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5) (2008).
179. Am. Capital 8-K. 
180. Nat’l Coal 8-K.
181. Id.
182. Open Solutions Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Open
Solutions 8-K]; PriceSmart, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
PriceSmart 8-K].
183. Open Solutions 8-K.
of the 8-Ks filed dealing with codes of ethics filed in the first half of
2007.  The goal was not methodological soundness—after all, we can say174
nothing conclusive about the frequency of waivers actually granted from
the 8-Ks filed—but rather some insight into the kinds of waivers some
corporations choose to disclose. Nineteen amendments to codes of ethics
were disclosed in the first quarter of 2007, and twenty-two companies filed
new codes of ethics.  In the second quarter, thirty-seven companies175
disclosed amendments, and twenty new codes were filed.  176
In the first quarter, only two waivers were disclosed via 8-K filings.177
One involved authorizing two officers to set up a 10b5-1 plan, allowing
them to trade in the company’s securities according to a predetermined
scheme over which the officers themselves would have had no control.178
In order to implement this plan, the company waived a provision in the
code of ethics forbidding trading during blackout periods.  The second179
waiver also involved a trade occurring in a blackout period, outside a
designated trading window.  The board justified its waiver because (1)180
the sale involved only the transfer of one block of shares to a single
institutional investor, (2) financial results from the prior year had been
disclosed just seven days before, and (3) the plan required five months
between trading windows.  181
During the second quarter, once again only two corporations disclosed
waivers of their codes of ethics on Form 8-K.  The board of one182
corporation granted a waiver of its insider trading policy to permit the
company chairman and CEO to make a charitable donation of common
stock during a regularly scheduled blackout period, a time at which he
would otherwise be unable to trade or donate stock.  The disclosure183
specified that the board had determined that the CEO was not aware of any
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188. See The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics, supra note 80, at 2129–30.
189. An “implicit waiver” is a “failure to take action within a reasonable period of time
regarding a material departure from a provision of the code of ethics that has been made known to
an executive officer.” Disclosure Required Release, supra note 157.
190. Delaware is the dominant source for corporate law in the United States. Jill E. Fisch,
Institutional Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 617, 619 (2005).
191. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008). 
material nonpublic information, and that the timing of the donation was for
“tax planning purposes.”  184
The second waiver indicated that managers had “[f]rom time to time”
used a private plane owned in part by officers and stockholders of the
corporation.  This scenario looks like a classic self-dealing transaction:185
the corporation chose to rent a plane owned by its own insiders and
stockholders. According to the disclosure, however, it appears that the
corporation paid market price, or less, for the executives’ airfare.  In a186
second related-party transaction, the corporation bought a one-sixteenth
interest in a corporate jet from the management-owned company, but
asserted that it was a better rate than the corporation would have received
from another supplier, NetJets.  187
Given the possibility for disclosure via website, it is impossible to
know whether these waivers per quarter are representative of post-
Sarbanes-Oxley departures from corporate codes of ethics. Fully
acknowledging this limitation, it seems safe to hazard that the reformers
who hoped that disclosure of such waivers might lead to more meaningful
information for investors may be disappointed. These waivers all seem
routine, innocuous, and mundane. Certainly none of them rise to the level
of the Enron board permitting Fastow’s self-dealing.  Of course, § 406188
may serve a preventative effect, forcing boards not to grant waivers that
they may have freely granted in the past. It is as likely, however, that
waivers (particularly implicit waivers)  are not being disclosed when189
made, despite the disclosure requirement. Either way, § 406 hardly appears
to offer investors assurance of robust enforcement of corporations’ codes
of ethics. 
3.  Enforcement of Conflicts via State Law
There is, of course, a mechanism by which many conflicts of interest
are already policed: state corporate law. Using Delaware as an example,190
the act of taking a corporate opportunity without first offering it to the
corporation, or engaging in self-dealing or related-party transactions
without availing oneself of the safe harbors afforded under Delaware
law,  already constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty that gives rise to191
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192. The notable exception being a buyout or acquisition, where because the shareholder is
being deprived of his or her status as shareholder, there is a direct cause of action. E.g., Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
193. Even presuming no management capture, however, corporations should be interested in
improving implementation and enforcement of conflicts rules. After all, reducing agency costs
results in savings to the corporation and to shareholders as a whole.
194. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1220 (Del. 1996), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). It can only be attacked
by showing that the board’s refusal to sue on the underlying claims was “wrongful.” Grimes, 673
A.2d at 1220. 
195. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 976–77
(Del. 2003).
196. Id. at 977 (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 930 (Del. 1993)). 
197. Id. 
198. For states following the Model Business Corporation Act, the result is much the same,
although the mechanism is slightly different. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2007) (“No
shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a written demand has been made
upon the corporation to take suitable action; and (2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand
was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the
corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration
of the 90 day period.”). 
liability. This raises two questions: (1) Do conflict-of-interest provisions
serve only as a tool for compliance with external law? and (2) Why should
corporations implement and enforce conflicts provisions when state-law
enforcement mechanisms are already in place? 
Both questions can be answered by describing the problematic nature
of current enforcement of Delaware fiduciary law. A corporation will
almost always have the sole cause of action in a conflicts case.  If the192
corporation is willing to pursue the cause of action against the faithless
agent, there is no problem: the corporation can sue. If an owner is
concerned about faithless agents capturing the management and board of
the corporation, however, then the ability of the board to sue an employee
will be but cold comfort.  After all, the board is ultimately in charge of193
the business decision of suing or not suing, and if it decides not to sue, its
business judgment will generally be respected.  A shareholder-plaintiff194
angry that an insider transaction has occurred must make a demand on the
board that it sue, unless she can argue that the demand requirement is
excused because it would be futile.  Demand is only excused if the board195
upon which the demand would have been made is not disinterested or
independent,  or the underlying transaction was not the product of a valid196
exercise of business judgment.  These thresholds are generally quite197
challenging, and the obstacles presented by the demand requirement are
substantial.  198
Federal securities laws do offer a potential end-run around the
derivative suit problem. Shareholders can file class-action suits based not
on the conflicting interest transaction itself, but instead on failure to
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199. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5) (2008).
200. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008) (offering no incentive for having
compliance provisions in place to prevent potential conflicts of interest), with THOMPSON MEMO,
supra note 92 (offering an incentive), and MCNULTY MEMO, supra note 93 (offering a very similar
incentive), and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2007) (offering a similar
incentive).
201. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
202. Id. at 961–62.
203. Id. at 969.
204. Id. at 970. 
205. Id. at 969.
206. Indeed, the International Corporate Governance Network Principle 5.1(6) includes among
the board’s “duties and responsibilities and key functions,” the following: “Monitoring and
managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members, shareholders, external
advisors and other service providers, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party
transactions.” Int’l Corp. Governance Network, ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance
Principles, http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/cgp/revised_principles_jul2005.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2008). Interestingly, the California Public Employee Retirement System, a major
U.S. pension fund, does not specify a concern with managerial conflicts in its own Core Principles
of Accountable Corporate Governance, but does, in its Global Principles of Accountable Corporate
Governance, embrace the principles of the International Corporate Governance Network. See Cal.
Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance 9 (2007),
available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/international/global/downloads/global-
corpgov-principles.pdf (describing the duties of the board as similar to those laid out by the
disclose it if it is material.  In terms of corporate governance, however,199
this claim is a blunt tool that sweeps in only in the most egregious cases.
It does not provide a reliable ex ante assurance for shareholders. 
As for the second question, whether Delaware already provides
enforcement mechanisms for conflicts, one must note that Delaware’s law,
unlike the DOJ memos or the Guidelines, offers no incentive for having
a compliance provision in place to prevent conflicts of interest.  In re200
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation’s  facts dealt with201
violations of federal and state rules and regulations pertaining to health-
care providers making referral payments.  Its language describes the202
“increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the criminal
law to assure corporate compliance with external legal requirements,
including environmental, financial, employee and product safety as well
as assorted other health and safety regulations.”  Given this trend, it says,203
part of the board’s duty is “to reach informed judgments concerning both
the corporation's compliance with law and its business performance.”204
The focus of both the court’s holding and language is on compliance with
“external legal requirements.”  Corporate fiduciary duties are discussed205
only in the context of the duty to monitor for this compliance with outside
rules. 
I am not denying that monitoring for managers’ conflicts of interest is
part of the board’s fiduciary duty. Indeed, the board should ensure that
internal controls are in place to train employees to recognize and report
conflicts as they arise.  But Delaware’s jurisprudence on the duty to206
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International Corporate Governance Network).
207. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 906 (2003). 
In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Delaware's use of quasi in rem
jurisdiction to reach corporate directors and officers, holding that the shares in a
Delaware-based corporation did not meet the constitutional minimum contacts
standard. The opinion distinguished Delaware's quasi in rem jurisdiction from
jurisdiction based on fiduciary status. The Delaware legislature responded by
passing a statute stating that the corporation's registered agent serves as the
directors’ agent, thereby creating a form of implied jurisdiction. The statute,
however, does not apply to officers. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2008).
209. Lyman Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers
(and Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147, 147–48 (2007).
210. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008). Section 5.02 of the A.L.I. Principles of Corporate
Governance similarly covers both directors and officers. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 41, § 5.02. But the Model Business
Corporation Act’s Subchapter F, §§ 8.60–8.63, explicitly covers only director conflicts. MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–8.63 (2007). 
monitor focuses solely on putting in place controls to monitor for
violations of external law. There is no Guidelines or DOJ memo structure
in place to reward the diligent, vigilant corporation. Avoidance of conflict
is its own reward.
Another roadblock to addressing conflicts of interest among officers
(not directors) is the problem of obtaining the power to sue them at all. As
Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale described, Delaware, the major state
for corporate law, needed to amend its jurisdictional statute in order for
courts to assert jurisdiction over officers.  In a 2004 amendment, the207
Delaware legislature extended personal jurisdiction to officers of Delaware
corporations.  This relatively recent amendment helps to explain why208
almost all Delaware litigation to date has focused on the duties and
liability of the directors, even though they are not the day-to-day
decisionmakers of the corporation.209
Many state laws do have a mechanism for sanitizing conflicts of
interest, such as Delaware’s § 144, which provides that no transaction
between a corporation and its director or officer, or in which a director or
officer has an interest, is voidable solely for that reason, if the material
facts are disclosed, and the transaction is approved by the majority of
disinterested directors, or by vote of the shareholders, or is fair to the
corporation and approved by the entire board.  But this measure will210
hardly reassure a prospective investor-owner who is concerned about
management conflicts of interest. Instead, it provides a mechanism to deal
with conflicts because presumably some conflicts are ultimately beneficial
to the corporation. Section 144 is not a self-operative mechanism; it
presupposes that managers are (1) able to identify conflicts and (2) willing
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211. 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
212. Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 82 (2005).
to disclose the particulars to the corporation’s board or shareholders.  If
either presumption is false—if managers cannot recognize conflicts, or are
unwilling to disclose them (perhaps because they are unmotivated by
existing governance mechanisms)—then § 144 has no effect.
The prospective investor-owner worries most about management
taking from the corporation. The importance of this problem depends
largely upon the extent to which one believes that reported cases of
conflict are the tip of the iceberg, or the entire iceberg. Believers in
efficient markets will trust that corporations that tolerate unchecked
conflicts of interest will ultimately lose out: the markets for products and
corporate control will reward corporations that are better able to restrain
managers from taking from the corporation. Non-believers can cite (1) the
failure of sanitizing provisions like § 144 to flush out conflicts ex ante, (2)
states’ focus on the board of directors and the structural impediments to
sue associated with the derivative suit, (3) the focus of federal enforcement
via the Guidelines and DOJ memos on compliance, and (4) the inefficacy
of disclosure in regulating conflicts. No matter which view one accepts,
it is clear that corporations currently lack a reliable way to signal credibly
an intention to follow a strict conflicts policy.
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS
As we have seen, although appropriate handling of conflicts of interest
is vital to an organization’s governance, current enforcement of
conflicts-of-interest provisions is haphazard at best. Most federal
regulation understandably focuses on compliance with external laws, but
at the same time at least ostensibly seeks to encourage the creation and
enforcement of codes of ethics that contain conflicts provisions. Sarbanes-
Oxley’s disclosure requirement encourages the adoption of codes of
ethics,  but perhaps only in a watered-down form. Data is difficult to211
obtain, but it appears that the disclosure-of-waiver requirement might not
be providing investors with the information the law intended. This Part
will survey various possible regulatory approaches.
A.  Potential Approaches
1.  Disclosure
Transparency, the requirement that the subject matter of the regulation
be disclosed, is theoretically one of the least intrusive means of regulation.
The SEC’s entire regulatory regime is premised on disclosure.212
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213. Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479 (2007).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 479–80 (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT 62 (1914)).
216. See supra notes 156–89 and accompanying text. 
217. Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 983–84 (2005).  
218. Benston, supra note 74, at 1345.
Presumptively, disclosure of information has several benefits: first, it
creates a more informed individual investor, who will therefore make
better investment decisions;  second, it creates a more accurate market,213
because the market as a whole will factor the disclosed information into
the price;  and third, as articulated so memorably by Louis Brandeis, it214
will deter fraud because “‘[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants.’”215
As discussed in Part III.B.2, § 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires
disclosure of codes of ethics for the CEO, CFO, and comptroller, and any
waivers granted from the code to these individuals.  Although it is too216
soon to draw conclusions, it does appear that this requirement may be
having the perverse effect of diluting ethics codes. The best-case scenario
is one in which the disclosure requirement triggers a serious internal
examination of why a corporate insider is seeking a waiver in the first
place, which culminates either in avoiding the conflict or making the
transaction as fair as possible to the corporation. Worse scenarios involve
weakening the code, which probably applies not only to the CEO, CFO,
and comptroller, but to other executives. Thus, we have a situation where
high-level executives outside this inner circle—if they need to obtain
waivers from an already lax code of conduct—need not disclose them.
Thus, an internal governance document focused on concerns about
collecting information on and ultimately deterring agency costs, may be
perverted into an inconvenient disclosure obligation prompting only the
desire to minimize liability exposure.
2.  External Monitoring 
a.  Mandatory: PCAOB
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, enforcement mechanisms for accountants, like
those for attorneys, were relatively weak.  Accountants could be217
externally disciplined in one of three ways. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants has long had the power to discipline its
members—but in practice censure rarely occurs.  One reason is that not218
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219. Id. 
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1346. 
222. E.g., TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 901.151 (2007).
223. For an instance in which a state board of accounting revoked a license, see Texas State
Board of Public Accountancy v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., No. 457-02-3095 (State Office of Admin.
Hearings Aug. 16, 2002), available at http://www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/pdffiles/AAENRON6.pdf.
224. For an insightful discussion of the PCAOB, see generally Nagy, supra note 217.
225. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (c) (2006). 
226. Id. § 7211(c).
227. PCAOB, Bylaws and Rules of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
Rule 3520 Auditor Independence, 51 (2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_
the_Board/Section_3.pdf. 
228. Id. at Rule 3522.
229. Id. at Rule 3523.
230. Id. at Rule 3521.
231. Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release No. 47265, Investment Company Act
Release No. 25915, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm.
all CPAs are members of the organization.  In addition, enforcement by219
membership organizations like the AICPA is difficult because of a lack of
resources and a vulnerability to lawsuits.  The SEC can discipline220
accountants, most pointedly by denying them the right to attest to financial
statements filed with the SEC.  State boards of accounting have the221
potentially significant power to revoke accounting licenses.  Again,222
however, license revocations rarely occur in practice, and then only in the
most egregious cases.223
Public company accountants now face a separate regulatory body, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  In224
Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress created this new entity to register accounting
firms that audit public companies, inspect firms regularly for compliance,
and investigate firms for violations of its rules.  In addition, PCAOB was225
charged with setting ethical rules for public company accountants.  Rule226
3520 requires that auditors be independent.  Independence is defined by227
not providing tax services to the client,  overseeing financial reporting228
for the client,  or receiving a contingent fee from the client.  PCAOB229 230
also enforces the SEC rules on independence, which require auditor
rotation, and a “cooling off” period before an audit firm employee can go
in-house at a public company.  231
It is unclear whether the PCAOB has been or will be any more
effective at enforcing ethics violations than its companion regulatory
bodies. Of the seventeen disciplinary proceedings listed on the PCAOB
40
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232. PCAOB, Disciplinary Proceedings, http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary_
Proceedings/index.aspx.
233. In re Goldstein & Morris, CPAs, P.C., No. 105-2005-001 (PCAOB May 24, 2005)
(censuring an entire firm because the auditor concealed documents from the board that
would have revealed that it had provided non-audit services, in violation of federal
securities law), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary_Proceedings/2005/
05-24_Goldstein_and_Morris.pdf; In re Goldberger, No. 105-2005-002 (PCAOB May 24, 2005)
(disciplining two individual accountants), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/
Disciplinary_Proceedings/2005/05-24_Goldberger_and_Postelnik.pdf; In re Susan E. Birkert, No.
105-2007-003, (PCAOB Nov. 14, 2007) (disciplining an accountant for attempting to invest in an
audit client), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary_Proceedings/2007/11-
14_Birkert.pdf; In re Kantor, Geisler & Oppenheimer, P.A., Steven M. Kantor, CPA, and Thomas
E. Sewell, No. 105-2007-009, (PCAOB Dec. 14, 2007) (disciplining an accountant for auditing a
client in which his parent had a material financial interest), available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary_Proceedings/2007/12-14_Kantor.pdf.
234. See, e.g., In re Wieseneck, Andres & Co., P.A., Release No. 105-2008-001 (PCAOB Apr.
22, 2008), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary_Proceedings/2008/04-
22_Wieseneck.pdf.
235. In re Reuben E. Price & Co. Pub. Accountancy Corp., No. 105-2005-005 (PCAOB Apr.
18, 2006), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Disciplinary_Proceedings/2006/04-
18_Ruben_E_Price.pdf.
236. Aspiring certified public accountants must fulfill numerous requirements. They must pass
a demanding multi-part exam, obtain a bachelor’s degree with a specified number of accounting
and business courses, and practice for a minimum number of years. Benston, supra note 74, at
1329. There is no separate professional responsibility licensing exam, as there is for attorneys. See
id. 
237. For an intriguing discussion of how common practices become enshrined as “best
practices,” see David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 297–98 (2006).
website,  only three detail ethics violations (although there are two232
associated proceedings, one against individual accountants, one against a
firm).  Most proceedings concern auditor failures to exercise “due233
professional care” and “professional skepticism” with respect to client
financial statements;  one faults the auditor for failing to take remedial234
action when its name was improperly used by a client.  Given this track235
record, PCAOB ethics enforcement may be more a matter of theory than
practice. Still, the accountant model is clearly one that emphasizes
enforcement over education.  236
b.  Voluntary: ISO
Even without a mandatory external monitor such as PCAOB,
regulating conflicts for senior corporate officers could begin to be seen as
best practices, and therefore widely adopted.  For example, Margaret237
Blair, Cynthia Williams, and Li-Wen Lin have studied the third-party
assurance industry, in particular the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), a non-governmental organization based in
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238. Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams, Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance
Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008).
239. Id. at 330–31; see also Murphy, supra note 104, at 414. The standards require a company
to make available its environmental policy, which must include compliance with local laws.
Murphy, supra note 104, at 414–15. There must be internal monitoring of its compliance with the
standards and internal or external audits. Id. at 415.
240. Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 238, at 332; Murphy, supra note 104, at 414.
241. Organizations like RiskMetrics Group’s ISS Governance Services and Standard & Poor’s
Corporation rate corporations on their corporate governance. For more information on ISS, see
Business Definition for: Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), http://www.allbusiness.com/
glossaries/institutional-shareholder-services-iss/4950922-1.html. For information on Standard &
Poor’s Corporation ratings, see www2.standardandpoors.com (follow “Ratings” hyperlink; follow
“About Us” under Ratings Home); see Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 103–06,
119–20 (Berkeley Elec. Press Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1597, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1597.
242. Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal
Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2004) (proposing that private legal systems cannot form
spontaneously, but rather must evolve in stages that begin with “facilitating activities that are
unrelated to regulating behavior”). 
Geneva.  They show how ISO started by establishing technical standards238
and facilitating accreditation of those standards.  It expanded to239
management systems, and then in 1996 it issued environmental
management systems standards called the ISO 14000 series.240
Corporations could participate in a similar voluntary program of third-
party certification. This model holds the added appeal of providing a
means for enforcement as well as education. 
A midway point between voluntary and mandatory conflicts
monitoring could come by means of pressure from ratings agencies like
RiskMetrics Group’s ISS Governance Services or Standard & Poor’s.241
If these agencies accord weight to corporations whose senior officers have
obtained conflicts licensing, then the practice will spread in advance of
any SEC or exchange mandate (as did, for example, the practice of a
majority independent board of directors). 
An obvious objection is that if such voluntary certification was a
valuable signal for a firm, it would have evolved already. Corporations,
after all, are free under state law to structure governance as they wish.
There are several potential explanations for the failure for such a system
to emerge. First, to the extent that a certification must have a critical mass
to be valuable, collective action problems might prevent a certifying body
from gaining traction. If we liken such a voluntary certification regime to
private ordering, Amitai Aviram’s work helps explain the difficulty of
spontaneous formation of private legal systems.  Without an immediate242
benefit to obtaining voluntary certification, there is no incentive for an
individual actor to do so. 
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243. Id.
244. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 5, at 665–69. Still, basic agency law principles impose
fiduciary duties on officers. Johnson & Millon, supra note 12, at 1601. 
245. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No.
8220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,001, 68 Fed.
Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
246. NYSE Manual, supra note 36, § 303(A) cmt.; NASDAQ Manual, supra note 126,
§§ 4200, 4350.
247. See Rodrigues, supra note 39, at 466–67 (arguing that although director independence
is especially important in conflict situations, independence should be redefined). 
Second, especially if one believes that managers often dominate the
boards that are supposed to monitor them, it might be too much to expect
a corporation’s agents to initiate a program that would restrict their ability
to exploit conflicts of interest and claim ignorance of the rules. Even if
there is no board capture, management may be unwilling, particularly as
first mover, to disclose an unusual interest in ethics that could signal a
reluctance to be as aggressive as its competitors. 
As Aviram’s work suggests, a way to encourage voluntary adoption of
such a system would be to provide a benefit for doing so.  Because state243
law governs conflicts of interest, perhaps according business judgment
rule protection to officers who have been certified would provide the
appropriate incentive. Current law is unclear as to the impact of the
business judgment rule on officers, however, because the case law focuses
on how the rule operates to protect board members.  244
3.  Structural Regulation: Independent Directors
Another regulatory possibility is to create corporate structures to
handle conflicts. Congress and the self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
have relied largely on independent directors to serve this role. While
Sarbanes-Oxley requires an independent audit committee,  the NYSE and245
N A S D A Q  m a n d a t e  i n d e p e n d en t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  a n d
nominating/governance committees, plus a majority-independent board.246
All these requirements involve attempts to anticipate areas in which
conflicts with management will emerge: Non-management nominating and
governance committees, for example, reflect an effort to ensure that
management is not in charge of board succession or rulemaking; non-
management audit committees are mandated to help ensure that
management cannot improperly influence the audit reports that are
supposed to help the board monitor management performance; and non-
management compensation committees ensure that management is not
setting its own salary. 
Independent directors serve an important purpose,  but are not well247
suited to monitor for conflicts. They are part-time representatives, often
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248. See Dorothy K. Light, SOAPBOX; Directors’ Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at 19.
249. One could tinker with these incentives by increasing the liability of independent directors.
The typical concerns raised with these solutions are that they would discourage prospective
directors from serving on the board, or would make the board unduly risk-averse.
250. Griffin, supra note 7, at 316. 
251. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 388–91 (2006); see also Bowman,
supra note 7, at 688–89 (arguing popularity of compliance due in part to its ability to help federal
prosecutors do their job while shifting costs to the corporation); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting
Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287,
1301–02 (2005) (“Companies benefit when they can develop self-regulatory strategies that
encourage their employees to take increased responsibility for rule following.”). For a critique of
the public/private regulatory partnership model as applied to corporate criminal prosecution, see
Griffin, supra note 7, at 343.
252. For example, in adopting a disclosure rule on codes of ethics, the SEC stated: “We
continue to believe that ethics codes do, and should, vary from company to company and that
decisions as to the specific provisions of the code, compliance procedures and disciplinary
measures for ethical breaches are best left to the company.” Disclosure Required Release, supra
note 157. 
253. With specific regard to internal controls, one commentator noted that, “[d]espite
substantial mandates and incentives to use internal controls, there is little specification of their
required content . . . . The availability of these broad-brushed mandates in control prescriptions
reinforces the appeal of this response to particular crises. The simplicity of the directive makes it
with challenging full-time jobs.  The forces that pressure them to248
monitor—the Guidelines, the DOJ memos, and Caremark-style case
law—all focus on external compliance, not internal conflicts of interest.
Therefore, while it would be beneficial to the corporation for the board to
ensure that conflicts are identified and properly handled, directors face no
liability for not doing so.  Still, while independent directors cannot be249
counted on to flush out conflicts of interest, once these transactions have
been identified, a truly independent and disinterested board (or board
committee) is the best mechanism for assessing the harm of the conflict to
the corporation. 
4.  Internal Monitoring 
a.  By Delegation
The Guidelines, DOJ memos, and other compliance regulations often
describe themselves as involving corporate “self-regulation.”  In fact,250
they are more a form of delegation—that is, governmental deputization of
the corporation to enforce criminal laws.  Government regulators claim251
that the nature of the “carrot and stick” approach makes it a less intrusive,
more self-regulatory approach. They are reluctant to impose particular
provisions on corporations.  The non-substantive nature of these rules252
also makes them more politically palatable.253
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easier to impose.” Cunningham, supra note 7, at 289.
254. These agreements “effectively deputize corporate counsel and auditors as government
agents; corporations are expected not only to raise the hue and cry when misconduct occurs but also
to assist in identifying, apprehending, and prosecuting viable employee targets.” Griffin, supra note
7, at 336 (footnote omitted). The appointment of independent compliance monitors is often a
feature of deferred prosecution agreements that the DOJ enters into with corporations in lieu of
prosecution. Id. at 323. Several commentators have pointed out how problematic this government
practice of “prescribing what is good corporate governance rather than just prohibiting wrongful
conduct” is. Id. at 324.
255. Krawiec, supra note 7, at 516–23. 
256. Attorneys and accountants also self-regulate, although for different reasons and in
different ways. Lawyers justify self-regulation in part as maintaining independence from state
power, a crucial status given our adversarial system. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 812–13 (1992). Giving the executive or legislative branches
the power to regulate lawyers might intimidate lawyers defending the individual against the state.
Id. at 813. Through Sarbanes-Oxley, public company accountants have ceded some self-regulation,
since the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board now establishes accounting standards
(including ethics standards) and regularly inspects auditing firms for compliance. Disclosure
Required Release, supra note 157.
257. Krawiec, supra note 7, at 500–02.
258. See id. at 519.
259. See id. at 496.
The key role of delegation becomes even more apparent when a
corporation enters into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
government.  Kimberly Krawiec, in particular, discusses the “negotiated254
governance” associated with compliance.  This delegation represents a255
form of government intrusion into the governance of the corporation, a
way for the government to enforce its laws by leveraging the resources of
the corporation. This delegation is ultimately part of shifting the cost-
benefit analysis to ensure that corporations comply with the law.
Conflicts present a question of internal corporate governance. Ethics
codes do not seem the place for intrusive, compliance-style regulation-by-
delegation.  Indeed enforcement of ethics codes by the government has256
been almost incidental to its main focus on legal compliance. The DOJ
memos, the Guidelines, and Sarbanes-Oxley all leave ethical enforcement
to the corporation.257
b.  Without an Intermediary
Another species of regulation of conflicts would be direct regulation,
whereby an outsider is empowered to monitor and enforce conflicts of
interest policies directly.  There have been examples of this model in258
both for-profit and non-profit settings. Typically an outside regulator
places an individual within the organization itself.  The triggering event259
for appointment of an outside monitor is generally some bad act by the
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260. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo
Announces Agreements with Columbia University and The National Association of Student
Financial Aid Administrators (May 31, 2007), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_cen
ter/2007/may/may31a_07.html.
261. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007).
262. Id. at 865.
263. Of course, many firms in the United States are privately owned.  Leonard M. Baynes, The
Q-626 Report: A Study Analyzing the Diversity of the 626 Largest Businesses, and the 105 Largest
Minority-Owned Businesses, in Queens, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1007, 1026 n.86 (2006). Presumably
organization. In the case of the financial aid offices scandal, for example,
part of the settlement with Columbia University was a commitment to
report to the New York Attorney General for the next five years “‘all
policies and procedures relating to student lending’ and [laying out] ‘any
conflicts or violations of the Code of Conduct.’”  Even more intrusively,260
a deferred prosecution agreement with KPMG permitted the DOJ to
appoint an “independent monitor,” who would review and monitor
KPMG’s compliance with the agreement, and its maintenance and
execution of its compliance and ethics programs for three years.  The261
monitor was empowered to review all employee correspondence and to
interview any KPMG partner, employee, or agent.  262
The reasons that weigh against applying internal monitoring via
delegation apply even more forcefully to direct internal monitoring.
Placing an outsider in the role of conflicts monitor is too blunt an
instrument for conflicts enforcement. Conflicts are not always bad for the
corporation; this observation is the reason for sanitizing mechanisms such
as Delaware’s § 144. The danger would be too great that an outsider would
impose costly measures that failed to monitor for conflicts at an optimal
level. 
5.  Liability Rule: State Corporate Law
A liability rule would provide no upfront regulation, but instead allow
shareholders to sue when an improper conflict arises. State law in fact
provides the primary conflicts enforcement mechanism in current practice.
Because of the nature of the derivative suit—where the decision whether
to sue is left solely in the board’s hands, unless the board is not
independent or is interested—relying on this approach seems highly
problematic. How problematic depends upon how much one trusts the
management of corporations to police their own agency costs, or owners
of a corporation to set up rules that will allow for robust policing. 
B.  The Proposal
In publicly held firms, with their widely dispersed ownership, exercise
of control over conflicts of interest is a key concern.  The current system263
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the owners of such firms are both incentivized and able to police managers for conflicts of interest.
Of course, nothing would prevent private owners from requiring certification of their managers if
they chose. 
264. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264
(2006)); see also supra Part II.A.
265. A question that comes up about any disclosure is the value to existing investors. For
example, in the case of Enron, existing investors might not have wanted the financial misconduct
at the company disclosed, or disclosed so abruptly. For a discussion of whom the securities laws
are intended to protect, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1280–81 (1999). Beforehand, conflicts
should be something that all corporations wish to avoid. Although certainly the inaccurate pricing
caused by agency costs can be guarded against with a diversified portfolio, these conflicts of
interest remain a “dead-weight social loss” that should be avoided whenever possible. Langevoort,
supra note 7, at 964.
does not require public corporations to train their officers in conflicts of
interest; only disclosure of the code of ethics that applies to senior officers
is mandated.  As seen in Part III.A, a code of ethics may be swept into264
the internal controls requirements or be part of a corporation’s attempts to
avoid Sentencing Guidelines penalties or escape entity-wide prosecution.
Still, there is no guarantee that a code of ethics will be implemented, much
less that it will be meaningfully communicated to employees or enforced.
One remaining approach offers real promise: education. Corporate
employees may not even be aware of the duties they owe their employers
in a conflict-of-interest situation. Evidence indicates that basic
understanding of what constitutes conflict may, indeed, be a problem for
corporate executives. One obvious solution would be to encourage or
mandate training in conflicts for the executives of public companies.
Certification of the upper tiers of management by an outside entity might
provide real value to a corporation’s investors.  This Part will conclude265
by recommending conflicts licensing for senior officers of public
corporations. It will first examine the attorney educational model, and then
offer preliminary thoughts on implementation mechanisms, both
mandatory and voluntary. 
1.  The Attorney Model
One example of the educational approach is the attorney model for
dealing with conflicts. Although professional conflicts are different from
intra-corporate conflicts of interest, there is a common thread. In each
case, the concern is ethical duties owed by one individual to another. In the
case of the corporation, the relationship at issue is between employee and
corporation. In the case of attorneys, the relationship is between
professional and client. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys include
specific provisions that deal with conflicts of interest. They forbid
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266. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
267. Specifically, Rule 1.8 forbids lawyers from entering into business transactions or
“knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to
a client unless” certain requirements are met. Id. at R. 1.8(a). Lawyers may not solicit gifts from
clients, acquire literary or media rights regarding the representation, provide financial assistance
to a client, accept payment for representation from a third party, limit their own liability for
malpractice, acquire a “proprietary” interest in the cause of action of litigation, or engage in a
sexual relationship with a client except under limited exceptions. Id. at R. 1.8. Another rule governs
duties to former clients. Id. at R. 1.9.
268. Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea of
a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1096 (2005). 
269. American Bar Association, Bar Admissions Basic Overview,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/baradmissions/basicoverview.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
270. See Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar
Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 36–39 (1994).
271. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of
Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons,
83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 456 (2005).
272. Id. 
representation where
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.266
Note that both conflicts between clients and those between the lawyer’s
self-interest and that of the client are forbidden, both in this rule and in
separate ones elaborating on the notion of conflict.267
Lawyers are licensed by state government. They must have a
bachelor’s degree, and most must attend a three-year law school and pass
the bar exam for the state in which they wish to be licensed.  Each state’s268
bar association administers a bar exam, composed both of a standard
multi-state test and a state-specific test.  Most states require continuing269
state bar membership.  In terms of ethical education, the ABA mandates270
that students at accredited law schools complete a course on professional
responsibility that covers the rules of professional conduct.  Almost all271
states require a separate ethics test, the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Examination.272
Lawyers seem better at education than enforcement. Indeed, as
Benjamin Barton observes,
[b]etween the MPRE and the ABA’s accreditation
requirement that law schools teach a mandatory professional
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273. Id. at 456–57 (footnote omitted). 
274. Of course, liability in the form of malpractice suits is another disciplining mechanism.
See Wilkins, supra note 256, at 806–07 (stating malpractice litigation is becoming an increasingly
viable alternative to professional discipline due to a number of developments, including relaxation
of the rule prohibiting claims by non-clients).
275. Id. at 805. 
276. Macey, supra note 268, at 1085. 
277. Id. at 1086.
278. Wilkins, supra note 256, at 807–08. 
279. See supra notes 266–67 and accompanying text.
280. Benston, supra note 74, at 1328–29; see also Macey, supra note 268, at 1096 (“The
admissions requirements to enter the profession . . .; the restrictions on nonlawyers practicing even
the most rudimentary aspects of law; the mandatory rules of confidentiality for lawyers, but not
accountants and other competitors (nonlawyer consultants and advisers); and restrictions on
marketing all benefit individual lawyers at the expense of clients and the profession as a whole.”).
281. Macey, supra note 268, at 1096. 
responsibility class, law students receive at least some
message that the bar is serious about law students learning the
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . Given that actual
enforcement of these minimum standards among licensed
attorneys is minimal, the MPRE may actually be the single
most important practical application of the black letter
Rules.  273
In general, enforcement mechanisms for attorney conflicts of interest
are relatively weak, and for this reason, I classify attorney conflicts
regulation as falling under the education model.  True, attorneys face274
sanctions from state agencies acting under the supervision of state supreme
courts,  but these penalties are generally administered by fellow lawyers275
who impose sanctions rarely, and harsh sanctions more rarely still.276
Courts are equally reluctant to impose sanctions.  Particular agencies,277
such as the SEC, can also sanction attorneys that appear before them.278
Clients can, of course, sue their attorneys over improper conflicts, but they
may lack the sophistication or information to enforce their right to
conflict-free representation. An attorney can seek to disqualify an
opposing attorney for conflicts reasons,  but again, this enforcement is279
haphazard at best. 
Lawyers are vulnerable to the criticism that their elaborate initial
licensing requirements operate less to gate-keep and more to bar entry to
maintain their professional “cartel” status.  One downside to requiring280
specific education, training, or licensing is the risk that these requirements
are more about maintaining exclusivity than about true education and
training. The lack of enforcement of certain rules may exacerbate this
sense that “professionalism” is more about exclusionary rules than about
maintaining standards.281
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282. For a discussion of the possibility of privilege attaching to the products of internal
investigations, see generally Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate Crime: The
Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
283. See id. 
284. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at 1645; Treviño et al., supra note 4, at 133–34. 
285. Steve Lohr, New Economy; Researchers seem confident that technology has made
American workers more efficient. Now some think they even know why, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004,
at C6 (stating “[t]here is something to the business adage that you can’t manage what you can’t
measure”).
286. So in evaluating a commentator’s praise of the role of whistleblowers as reporting
“roughly one-third of fraud and other economic crimes against businesses,” the “one-third” must
necessarily only be of reported fraud. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to
Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117 (2006). 
287. Id. at 1173.
2.  Education’s Superiority to Enforcement 
Enforcement of conflicts policies is a tricky matter for corporations.
Concerns about confidentiality, opening the corporation up to liability, and
the problem of what baseline to use to judge a well-functioning conflicts
system all complicate any direct enforcement effort by a third party. Thus
education presents an attractive alternative to outside enforcement.
First, reliance on any third-party regulatory body would entail
revealing sensitive internal information. A corporation would naturally be
concerned about disclosure of confidential information if it were to
disclose potential conflicts of interest arising within it.  There would also282
be concerns about shielding itself from liability for disclosure.  One283
common observation is that many calls to corporate “hotlines” are not
about reporting misconduct, but rather seeking clarification about the rules
and how they apply to gray areas.  If all calls to a hotline must be284
reported externally, a corporation may be more reluctant to put a hotline
in place at all.
A separate concern is that, with respect to effective enforcement, the
appropriate baseline for conflict detection is unclear. Attempts to measure
the success of compliance efforts run into the same problem. An old
management mantra counsels that you “can’t manage what you can’t
measure.”  But it is unclear how an effective conflicts policy might be285
measured.  For example, a commentator asserts that disclosure of how286
many complaints come in will show which programs are good and which
are bad.  But how does one measure success: Is the ideal result more or287
fewer reported complaints? More reported complaints might indicate a
greater understanding of conflicts or willingness on the part of employees
to report occurrences, and fewer conversely might indicate ignorance,
apathy, or fear. On the other hand, more reported complaints could signal
a major problem with the culture of the organization. 
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288. As they observe, the boundaries of corporate officers’ duties are unclear, but some duty
of loyalty must exist. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 5, at 665. 
289. Id. at 663.
290. Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Employers as Vigilant Chaperones Armed with Dating Waivers: The
Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer Liability in Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Law, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 325, 353–54 (1999).
291.  Treviño et al., supra note 4, at 139–40. 
292.  Hess, supra note 130, at 1797.
A recent article indicates that education of corporate officers on these
ethical issues would, even standing alone, be a valuable accomplishment.
In (Not) Advising Corporate Officers about Fiduciary Duties, Lyman
Johnson and Rob Ricca find that lawyers generally do not advise corporate
officers about fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty.  They begin288
their article with a provocative quotation from Disney’s CFO: “I was not
aware that it was a breach of the duty of loyalty to place one’s own
interests ahead of the interests of shareholders.”  Although Disney may289
be an extreme case, there may, indeed, be a lack of basic knowledge on the
part of senior officers of their duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and
exactly what conflicts of interest entail. Even if the Disney CFO’s
response was disingenuous, an initial licensing mechanism for corporate
officers of public companies, similar to that required for attorneys and
accountants, could at least prevent protestations of complete ignorance as
to the basic duties owed.
There is reason to believe that education is needed. Part of the problem
is a lack of understanding of the nature of conflicts of interests and how to
handle them. Conflicts are a complicated and nuanced area. For example,
it may not occur to a corporate actor that a business opportunity presented
to her constitutes a corporate opportunity that by right should be offered
to the corporation. One can draw an analogy to the field of sexual
harassment law, where different cultural backgrounds can lead to different
understandings of appropriate behavior, and where education is therefore
important.  Neither compliance enforcement, Sarbanes-Oxley, nor state290
law currently offers any incentive for officers to learn about conflicts rules
and to avoid conflicts of interest. 
The work of business ethicists reveals the importance of a culture of
ethics, and a focus on more than mere compliance.  If the social norms291
of a corporation encourage fraud or a failure to report misconduct, a code
of ethics, even if in place will not be effective.  As David Hess writes: 292
In large business organizations, the pressures to conform and
the uncertainty surrounding any decision can be
significant[] . . . . Inexperienced managers must rely on local
norms for guidance in periods of uncertainty, which can lead
to the continuation of wrongful activity. As one employee in
a risk-management position at Enron stated:
“If your boss was [fudging], and you have never worked
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293.  Id. (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citing John A. Byrne, Mike France
& Wendy Zellner, The Environment was Ripe for Abuse, BUS. WK., Feb. 25, 2002, at 118, 119).
294. NYSE Manual, supra note 36, § 303A(10). The other topics, in order, are (1) corporate
opportunities (which I include as a subset of conflict of interest), (2) confidentiality, (3) fair
dealing, (4) protection and proper use of company assets, (5) compliance with laws, rules and
regulations (including insider trading laws), and (6) encouraging the reporting of any illegal or
unethical behavior. Id. 
anywhere else, you just assume that everybody fudges
earnings . . . .  Once you get there and you realized how it
was, do you stand up and lose your job? It was scary. It was
easy to get into ‘Well, everybody else is doing it, so maybe
it isn’t so bad.’”293
The presence of an outside organization offering an alternate account of
ethics could help to combat the problem of faulty local norms. 
Finally, the danger of cartelization that educational certification poses,
and the historical exclusion of disfavored groups such as women and racial
and religious minorities that exists with the licensing of professionals like
lawyers is less of a concern for public company officers for several
reasons. First, because business is not a traditional profession with a
concomitant requirement of a license or certification, individuals with no
formal education start businesses every day. Secondly, while it would be
difficult to argue that the high-level officers of today’s corporations are
diverse by any measure, the barriers to entry that prevent women and
minorities from filling those offices are already in place. Once an
individual has reached the rarefied height of being considered for the
highest positions in publicly held corporations, it seems doubtful that a
conflicts certification, which would be the result of at most a few days’
training and possibly a test, would bar anyone from service. 
3.  Potential Implementation Mechanisms 
To present a real change from the status quo, a third-party organization
must administer the licensing. The easiest method would be an exam
focused on conflicts administered to all senior public company officers,
roughly speaking from the vice-president level up, including the chief
executive officer, chief financial officer, and chief operating officer.
Implementing this requirement could take several forms. Most directly,
the SEC could make licensing of senior officers mandatory for public
companies or require companies to disclose whether senior officers are
conflicts-licensed and if they are not licensed, explain why they are not.
Alternatively, the NYSE and NASDAQ could make officer conflicts
licensing a listing requirement for their respective exchanges. Indeed, as
already noted, the NYSE places conflicts of interest first on its list of
topics to be included in its listed companies’ codes of ethics, so conflicts
are already a concern.  294
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295. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure
of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1147, 1150 (2006) (suggesting that the directors’ and officers’ liability insurer was just as much to
blame for the Enron collapse as were other gatekeepers). But see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The
Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1795, 1808–14 (2007) (discussing why the D&O insurance market currently does not monitor
corporate governance effectively).
If the SEC or the exchanges do not mandate officer conflicts licensing,
other existing institutions can encourage this practice. Adoption by the ISS
or Standard & Poor’s of licensing as part of corporate governance scoring
would spur wider adoption of conflicts education as corporations try to
improve their scores and thus attract institutional investors. Insurers
providing director and officer liability insurance could tie the price of
premiums to the amount of conflicts training senior officers have had.295
Having the DOJ or the Guidelines consider officer licensing in
determining whether to prosecute or what sentence to impose could also
encourage the practice.
Finally, patterned on the ISO model, a third-party organization could
simply begin to certify officers on its own. This last mechanism will prove
least effective because, absent endorsement of conflicts licensing by an
outside institution such as RiskMetrics’ ISS, Standard & Poor’s, the DOJ,
or the Guidelines, a certifying organization would have difficulty
acquiring the initial legitimacy it would need for officer certification to be
worth the effort by a corporation.
V.  CONCLUSION
Conflicts of interest represent an essential problem of corporate
governance, and ignorance of the nature of conflicts is part of this
problem. State law, because of the complexity of the derivative suit,
largely depends on corporate self-interest to police conflicts; it fails to
focus on the true decisionmakers of the corporation, the officers. Federal
mechanisms only obliquely regulate conflicts via disclosure and
compliance, and may even exacerbate the problem by making it more
risky for a corporation to enforce optimal conflicts policies. Education
offers an alternative: it emphasizes the importance of conflicts, and it can
prevent some conflicts problems from arising, something current
mechanisms fail to do.
53
Rodrigues: From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the Office
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
